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Cognitive epistemic systems are reasoning structures that promote an individual’s 
categorization of group members through processes known as cognitive epistemic 
essentialist entitativity (EEE). The propensity of these processes to become stagnant is 
known to lead to stereotyping and prejudiced behaviors when individuals are presented 
with ambiguous information about outgroup members. Educational materials about the 
contributions, cultural patterns, and social customs of ethnic and cultural groups can 
reduce stereotyping and prejudiced behaviors. However, whether being presented this 
material through multicultural psychosocial education in a formal setting is an effective 
strategy to influence the malleability of EEE processes has not been addressed as a means 
to shift xenophobic and prejudice discourse. The purpose of this quasi-experimental study 
was to determine whether malleability of EEE processes resulted from the presentation of 
multicultural psychosocial educational material in a college classroom. The epistemic 
need for closure theory, intergroup contact theory, and essentialist theory of race 
provided the framework for the study. The Essentialist Entitativity Scale was used to 
compare the malleability of EEE processes of 67 college students who completed an 8-
week course based on multicultural psychosocial educational material and 67 college 
students who did not. An ANCOVA analysis of pre- and posttest data revealed that 
students who received the culturally rich educational material reported significantly 
greater malleability of EEE processes than those who did not.  Findings may be used to 
inform educators, educational leaders, and social activists about the malleability of EEE 
processes, and may provide a strategy to reduce racism, stereotyping, xenophobia, and 
prejudice.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Cognitive epistemic systems are social processes by which the individual 
generates truth, falsity, and judgments (Kosic, Phalet, & Minnetti, 2012). The processes 
are known as epistemological attitudes and beliefs that are components of the individual 
metacognitive systems of knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). When epistemically 
motivated, individuals are known to make ethnic categorizations that are thought to serve 
as social reality. One epistemic process is essentialism. Rangel and Keller (2011); 
Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron (1997); and Haslam and Levy (2006) presented 
essentialism as a process in which an individual considers group members as having an 
underlying and immutable sameness. According to the essentialist theory of race (Chao, 
Hon, & Chiu, 2013), an individual is prone to view another race in totality, believing all 
persons belonging to that race share the same clear and unalterable physical and 
psychological markings. When determining the identity and category of others and 
interpreting others as fundamentally alike, the individual makes inferences referred to as 
entitativity (Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013). In social cognitive neuroscience, these 
processes are known as epistemic essentialist entitativity (EEE; Roets & Van Hiel, 
2011b).  
The EEE processes are known to become stagnant resulting in the individual 
ignoring differing or conflicting information than that presently held (Tadmor, Hong, 
Chao, Wiruchnipawan, & Wang, 2012). Stagnation or freezing of the processes has been 
noted when information and exposure to outgroups is not consistently presented, thereby 
resulting in the individual’s tendency to group all who are perceived to be different (Chao 





epistemic processes as a result of consistently introducing information about various 
ethnicities and cultures through a multicultural psychosocial educational course. 
Social expectations about outgroup members are referred to as the psychosocial 
norm for race or expected outgroup norms (Bradley et al., 2004). The expectations 
attached to the individual’s belief in racial outgroup psychosocial norms include the 
assumption of knowing what is to be normally expected in the outgroup member’s 
behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes. Research addressing the psychosocial norm for race or 
group norms has shown the EEE processes are instrumental in shaping the expectations 
an individual has regarding racial outgroups (Bradley et al., 2004; Nesdale, Maass, 
Durking, & Griffiths, 2005). When the EEE processes are stagnant, previously held 
skewed beliefs of the psychosocial norm for race have been shown to precipitate displays 
of prejudice, racial hatred, and disdain toward members of racial and ethnic outgroup 
members (Bradley et al., 2004; Nesdale et al., 2005).  
Epistemic processes have been linked to an individual’s propensity to hold 
prejudiced opinions, racist beliefs, and xenophobic attitudes (Ommundsen, Van Der 
Veer, Yakushko, & Ulleberg, 2013; Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013; Roets & Van Hiel, 
2011b; Tadmor et al., 2012). When EEE processes are frozen and individuals harbor 
prejudice and xenophobic attitudes, race relations in a growing population of immigrants 
in the United States can be tenuous. Given the mix of racial groups in the United States, a 
study addressing harmonious racial and ethnic integration of outgroup members may 
promote positive social change.  
Chapter 1 includes the background of the epistemic processes and decision-





become stagnant. I present the purpose of this study, research questions and hypotheses, 
theoretical framework, nature of the study, definitions of terms, assumptions, limitations, 
and delimitations. I also explain the significance of examining EEE processes as they 
relate to theory and race relations, as well as the implications for positive social change. 
Background 
Research has shown that epistemic processes are a catalyst in motivating an 
individual’s construction of knowledge through the act of applying subjectivity to social 
reality (Kruglanski, 1989). The epistemic need for closure is a theory that addresses the 
motivational nature of the process of cognitively constructing perceived knowledge in an 
attempt to form firm answers to ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Known to 
affect an individual’s information processing and cognitive salience, the need for closure 
is a tendency to engage in quick judgments based upon perceived knowledge. 
Information is processed with a sense of urgency and permanence in an attempt to gain 
rapid mental closure when ambiguous stimuli are introduced (Roets & Van Hiel, 2010). 
Epistemically, the need for closure assists in providing a desirable judgment made 
quickly and easily, while considering any additional information as inconvenient (Rangel 
& Keller, 2011) and unimportant. The need for closure additionally assists in the 
individual’s depleted cognitive salience with regards to information considered 
ambiguous or contradictory. Possessing a tendency of permanence, an epistemic process 
protects the information, holds on to it, or freezes it in an effort to strengthen the 
consolidation of knowledge and protect the epistemic processes from any further 
contradictory information. This processing procedure is known to lead to stereotyping 





The epistemic processes include decision-making processes (Kubota, Banaji, & 
Phelps, 2012) in which the amygdala, a subcortical structure in the anterior lobe of the 
brain, plays an important part. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is another region of 
the brain involved in cognitive control tasks such as decision-making (Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Neuroimaging indicates these areas of the brain show 
less activity or inactivity when EEE processes freeze and do not allow for additional 
cognitive processing of perceived ambiguous information. Neuroimaging research has 
provided evidence of both ACC and amygdala activation, also known to be the process of 
unfreezing the individual’s EEE processes with consistent viewing of phenotypic 
stimulus (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). However, 
the ability to unfreeze the EEE processes through exposure to multicultural psychosocial 
education that teaches ethnic differences and similarities; culturally specific behaviors 
and beliefs; and concepts of stigma, stereotypes, classism, prejudice, and racism has not 
been studied. 
Statement of the Problem 
Researchers have not adequately addressed how the cognitive epistemic processes 
are affected through exposure to multicultural psychosocial education. Although previous 
researchers have shown that multicultural experiences have an enhancing effect on the 
simple cognitive and generalized motivation of learning in an individual, more specific 
cognitive processing that occurs at deeper levels related to the epistemic essentialist 
processes have not yet been studied (Tadmor et al., 2012). Research assessing an 
individual’s cognitive tendency to endorse stereotypes through consistent and long-term 





somewhat receptive to searching for additional new material following this consistent 
exposure (Tadmor et al., 2012). However, research has also shown that the exposure to 
multicultural indicators, such as phenotypical stimuli being experienced or brief 
interpersonal encounters in a consistent and long-term manner, has not been consistently 
correlated with epistemic change, either permanent or temporary. The lack of movement 
in the EEE processes has been demonstrated through the simple mentioning of a name in 
which cultural and semantic attributes are present. These attributes are powerful enough 
to activate stereotypes thought to be secondary to the epistemic essentialist entitativity 
processes becoming stagnant (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2007). This practice, frequently seen in 
discriminatory hiring situations, has been shown to be consistent with aversive racism 
and the freezing of the epistemic essentialist entitativity processes (Ahmed, 2010) and 
requires further study to examine the effects of brief and long-term exposure to 
multicultural experiences.  
The intent of this study was to explore the effect of psychosocial educational 
materials about multicultural practices, languages, individuality, and outgroups on 
cognitive salience through the EEE processes and their malleability among college 
students. I examined whether this type of educational material prevents the freezing of 
EEE processes or unfreezes the processes to make them more malleable. I investigated 
whether consistent and informative portrayals of outgroups would result in a shift in 
xenophobic and prejudice discourse for individuals and social groups. Haas (1992) 
argued the epistemic community is one way to account for the influence a knowledge-
based expert has in defining and explaining complex problems. A knowledge-based 





particular discipline. By investigating the impact of a multicultural psychosocial course 
taught by an expert in the field, I hoped to catalyze further exploration of consistent 
exposure through learning about differing cultures and ethnic groups from those 
considered an epistemic community. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine whether significant 
differences were observed in the malleability or unfreezing of the EEE cognitive 
processes between individuals who participated in a multicultural psychosocial 
educational course and those who had not. Previous research showed that multicultural 
experiences enhance simple cognitive generalized motivation rather than more specific 
cognitive processing at deeper levels, such as those related to the epistemic essentialist 
processes (Tadmor et al., 2012).  
Nature of the Study 
A quantitative approach was appropriate to examine epistemic essentialist 
entitativity. I employed a quasi-experimental design to compare the depth of cognitive 
salience of participants as managed by the EEE processes. The results obtained from the 
sample may be generalized to the college population of interest. In keeping with the 
essentialist theory of race (Chao et al., 2013), intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; 
Pettigrew, 1998) and Need for Closure (NFC) (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), I examined 
how cognitive epistemic essentialist entitativity is affected by multicultural psychosocial 
information. 
The introduction of the information was done through the presentation of 





psychosocial course at a Midwestern community college. The educational material 
consisted of an introduction to the history, contributions, cultural patterns, and social 
customs of major ethnic and cultural groups located in the United States (see Appendix 
A). I examined whether participating in a psychosocial culturally rich educational course 
would promote the unfreezing or malleability of the cognitive epistemic essentialist 
entitativity processes. The unfreezing or malleability of the EEE processes is 
characterized by an individual’s awareness of the incompleteness of his or her 
internalized representations of another culture or outgroup (Roets, Arne, & Van Hiel, 
2011). The results of a posttest served as the dependent variable (DV) as measured by the 
Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The following served as this study’s research questions and hypotheses: 
Research Question 1  
Is there a difference in the depth of cognitive salience through the malleability of 
epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who have 
participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who 
have not? 
H01: There is no difference in the depth of cognitive salience through the 
malleability of epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who 
have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those 
who have not. 
Ha1: There is a difference in the depth of cognitive salience through the 





have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those 
who have not. 
Research Question 2 
Is there a difference in the epistemic essentialist-driven depth of cognitive 
salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be noted in the perception 
of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who have participated in a 
multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who have not? 
H02: There is no difference in the epistemic essentialist-driven depth of cognitive 
salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be noted in the perception 
of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who have participated in a 
multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who have not. 
Ha2: There is a difference in the epistemic essentialist-driven depth of cognitive 
salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be noted in the perception 
of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who have participated in a 
multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who have not. 
Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical framework for this study was partially grounded in the essentialist 
theory of race (Chao et al., 2013). This theory proposes that individuals believe race is a 
stable and natural entity and is the biologically based essence of an individual. The theory 
additionally refers to the freezing or stagnation of the epistemic cognitive processes 
involved in essentialism (Chao et al., 2013). The role of racial essentialism has been 
found to be influenced by the individual’s cognitive need for racial categorization. Race-





individuals’ heightened tendency to discern racial group membership quickly and easily 
(Chao et al., 2013).  
Wagner et al. (2010) argued the essentialist theory of race presents a cognitively 
and culturally logical basis for thinking that enhances the tendency to essentialize or 
group together members of outgroups as mutually exclusive entities. Wagner et al. (2010) 
argued essentialist thinking is a form of cognitive processing in which the individual 
assumes an underlying essence or substance in others. The individual is then seen to have 
the tendency to possess both the ability and desire to process the outgroup as one having 
an essence. This reasoning is based on the individual’s tendency to consider the genes of 
another to be the causal agent for the observable behavior. The effects of this cognitive 
process while compiling essentialist attributions based on social beliefs have been shown 
to have a significant influence on developing stereotypes, outgroup discrimination, 
racism, and xenophobia (Allport, 1954; Wagner et al., 2010; Wagner, Holtz, & Kashima, 
2009). 
Keeping this theory in mind, it is important to consider the individual’s 
inclination to gather essentialist attributions based on social beliefs that have been shown 
to be cognitively processed. This is done in an attempt to group those of a similar 
essence. I applied this theory to help me answer Research Question 1 by examining 
potential differences in the depth of cognitive salience through the malleability of 
epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who participated in 
a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who did not. 
Intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) also served as a 





(Cameron & Rutland, 2006; Nelson, 2009), intergroup contact theory suggests that 
individuals who interact with members of outgroups develop positive concepts regarding 
members of the outgroup. According to Pettigrew (1998), the prejudiced individual 
develops a propensity for essentialist entitativity from a lack of positive and personal 
interactions with those in outgroups. Pettigrew argued that individuals will cognitively 
guide themselves to essentialist entitativity without conscious effort when not exposed to 
outgroups. 
The theory of cognitive need for closure (NFC; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) also 
guided this study. NFC refers to an individual’s cognitive epistemic need to draw quick 
and convenient conclusions while blocking or freezing against the cognitive processing 
of contradictory information; a reduced level of cognitive saliency is known to be 
precursor to racism and behaviors of essentialism (Rangel & Keller, 2011). This theory 
assisted in answering Research Question 2 and the possible unfreezing or malleability of 
the EEE systems. The essentialist theory of race (Chao et al., 2013), intergroup contact 
theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998), and NFC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) guided 
the examination of the epistemic essentialism entitativity processing known to be an 
important variable in the development of racist attitudes and behaviors. These theories 
are discussed further in Chapter 2. 
Operational Definitions  
Amygdala: The region of the brain considered to be highly involved in social 






Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC): A region of the brain that monitors the 
individual’s response to stimuli and response competition.  
Blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) MRI: A noninvasive technique used to 
assess oxygenation under physiologic and pathophysiologic conditions (Neugaren & 
Golestaneh, 2014).  
Electrophysiology: The study of biological cells and tissues as they relate to 
biological brain cells (Rule, Freeman, & Ambady, 2013). 
Epistemic processes: Individual metacognitive systems of knowing that serve as 
the individual’s knowledge-based regulatory validation of information (Hofer & Pintric, 
1997; Richter & Schmid, 2010; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). 
Epistemic freezing: A neurocognitive process by which an individual’s epistemic 
processing seizes and freezes social information while preserving it and strengthening it 
in an attempt to protect against any new or contradictory information (Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). 
Epistemic seizing: A metacognitive process by which the individual quickly  
processes information to fulfill the need for knowing (Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 
2000).  
Essentialism: The metacognitive process providing for the belief that all members 
of a social category share an unchangeable and fixed underlying nature (Rangel & Keller, 
2011; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). 
Entitativity: An epistemic process in which a collection of individuals are 
distinguished together as a singular group without possession of individual attributes 





Executive control: Management and control of reasoning, problem solving, and 
cognitive processing (Botvinick et al., 2001). 
Fusiform gyrus (FFA): A brain function known to assist in the processing of 
racial information and in-group facial recognition (Kubota et al., 2012).  
Magnetic response imaging (MRI): A test using magnetic fields and radio wave 
energy to produce images of body organs (Aragona, Kotzalidis, & Puzella, 2013). 
Medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC): A portion of the human brain that is stimulated 
when an individual is reasoning and explaining out-group behaviors and intentions 
(Mason & Morris, 2010).  
Need for closure: An epistemic process by which an individual seeks clear and 
enduring answers to ambiguous social stimuli (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Roets & 
Van Hiel, 2010). 
Mirror neurons: Brain cells known to fire when an individual acts and observes a 
behavior of another, in turn, allowing the individual to mirror the behavior as if the 
observer was the acting individual (Winerman, 2005). 
Neuropsychology: A scientific field in which the relationship between the brain, 
behaviors, and mind are assessed (Mason & Morris, 2010).  
Neuropsychological signaling: The process by which various areas of the brain, 
through neural activity and circuitry signals, influence an individual’s executive control 
and processing (Botvinick et al., 2001; Mason & Morris, 2010).  
Positron emission tomography scan (PET scan): Nuclear medical imaging 






Psychosocial norm for race: Psychosocial factors and social norms assigned to 
racial categories (Bradley et al, 2004; Nesdale et al., 2005).  
Xenophobia: Fear or hatred of those from other countries, or any stimulus that is 
perceived as strange or foreign (Kumar & Seay, 2011); an attitude and  
behavioral prejudice toward immigrants and anyone who appears foreign (Ommundsen et 
al., 2013).  
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
The Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011; see Appendix 
B) is a 12-item instrument used to assess the level of belief structure the individual holds 
about racial groups, and to assess the epistemic belief concepts of race uniformity, race 
inherence, and informativeness. I assumed this instrument had not been used previously 
with any of the participants in the study; therefore, bias from instrument exposure should 
not have been an issue in this study. I also assumed the sample size was appropriate for 
this study,  
and I followed the administration and scoring requirements as directed for the 
Essentialists Entitativity Beliefs scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). Finally, I assumed the 
participants would answer the questions honestly and completely.  
Limitations  
A primary limitation was external validity. I conducted a quasi-experimental 
study to examine malleability in the EEE processes, and participants’ previous 
experiences with members of outgroups were acknowledged as assessed by the 





participants about any unpleasant experiences with members of an outgroup during the 
eight week period of time in which the study was being conducted. Any negative 
experience may be considered a threat to the post-test beliefs and reflected on the 
participants post-test. Additionally, threats to internal validity were considered by 
comparing both groups’ scores prior to the multicultural psychosocial educational 
material being introduced. Selection bias was also considered. To mitigate selection 
history and selection maturation threats prior to the study, I asked participants in the 
comparison group to refrain from engaging in a multicultural educational course during 
the 8-week research period.  
To address construct validity, the generalizability of the IV was considered by 
which I considered the current course content as being generalizable to all participants 
and the population as a whole.  The content of the 8-week course included cultural and 
ethnic information per the course curriculum guide. The course covered broad cultural 
differences and offered participants a thorough education regarding predominant cultures 
residing inside and outside of the United States. The curriculum addressed the face, 
predictive, and concurrent validity issues that should have been considered in research 
with an IV such as a multicultural psychosocial course. The current curriculum validty 
was addressed through periodic assessment of the participant’s knowledge of the material 
that was presented. The measurement was taken several times throughout the term by 
tests and quizzes.  
Last, a confounding variable was participants’ daily encounters with those in 
outgroups while participating in the study. Any random encounters and experiences the 





participants to report any significant encounters outside of the course via the debriefing 
form. 
Delimitations 
I examined malleability of the EEE processes in individuals by measuring the 
processes both before and after participation in a multicultural psychosocial educational 
course. The EEE processes were assessed for any measurable movement in both male and 
female undergraduate college students age 18 and over from a large Midwestern 
community college. Participants included those who were enrolled in a multicultural 
psychosocial educational course and those who were not enrolled or had never enrolled. 
I did not intend to examine the effects of short-term and inconsistent exposure to 
the educational material and did not include participants under the age of 18 years. As the 
EEE processes have not been shown to become stagnant or freeze in early childhood or 
adolescence (Tadmor et al., 2012), the inclusion of this age group would have been 
neither relevant nor feasible. The inclusion of graduate students was not considered 
because this population was not available at the community college of interest. Male and 
female college students who have never engaged in a multicultural psychosocial 
educational course were included as a comparison group. 
The dependent variable was results of the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale 
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) measuring the level of belief structure of the individual as well 
as epistemic belief concepts. I chose this empirically sound scale to assess epistemic 
thought processes in the treatment and control groups. 
The theoretical perspectives that grounded this study were the essentialist theory 





cognitive NFC. These theories served as frameworks for examining the participants’ 
responses. The intergroup contact theory guided the immediate intergroup learning 
between the participants. This theory purports those experiencing intergroup contact are 
apt to develop increasingly positive concepts regarding outgroups. NFC, which is a 
process related to cognitive essentialism (Rangel & Keller, 2011), was also used to guide 
the study.  
I used a convenience sample of 134 undergraduate college students 18 years of 
age and older. The sample included those enrolled in the multicultural psychosocial 
course and those who had not participated in such an educational experience.  
Significance of the Study 
I investigated the possible malleability of the epistemic essentialist entitativity 
processes, an underresearched area in social cognitive neuroscience and the social 
psychology disciplines. Prior research indicated that individuals who have experienced 
epistemic motivation have less implicit and explicit prejudice toward outgroup members 
(Lun et al., 2007). I examined whether malleability or unfreezing of the EEE systems 
occurred through consistent exposure to multicultural psychosocial information. Lun et 
al. (2007) illustrated through classic social psychology experiments that those who 
experience a motivation to acquire knowledge elicited by a state of uncertainty use the 
opinions currently held in the immediate social context in an attempt to form judgment. 
The results of these studies provided much needed insight into the epistemic cognitive 
processes and offered a catalyst in researching the role of a multicultural psychosocial 





The limited functioning or nonfunctioning of the EEE process is a known 
precursor of prejudiced behaviors (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b), aversive racism 
(Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013), and xenophobic attitudes (Ommundsen et al., 2013). 
Because the epistemic system is known to freeze and become stagnant (Tadmor et al., 
2012), this investigation into the malleability of the EEE processes through multicultural 
exposure may allow for social change in providing a greater understanding of the role of 
multicultural experiences and educational materials. The findings provided insight into 
whether the exposure to knowledge about outgroups can be considered as a possible 
means to encourage malleability and a positive change in attitudes and behaviors toward 
outgroup members previously viewed as sharing one essence. 
Extended contact theory (Cameron & Rutland, 2006), which is based on 
intergroup contact theory, may assist in encouraging further research and exploration into 
the long-term outcome. Future examinations into the effect of exposure and contact 
through consistent multicultural exposure may assist in the knowledge of ways to keep 
the EEE processes from freezing or becoming stagnant. According to Monteith (1993) 
and Rudman, Ashmore, and Gary (2001), an individual requires conscious intention, 
time, and effort to achieve stereotypical judgments. My study addressed the more recent 
work that has indicated that in some cases prejudice and implicit stereotyping could be 
reduced or altered without the individual’s deliberate attempt and efforts. Further 
research into the effects of exposure may enhance the understanding of the development 
and changing of what were once thought to be implicit cognitive judgments. This may be 






Implications for Social Change 
In a country where segregation (Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013) and racial 
categorization (Tadmor et al., 2012) remain prevalent, the need for the investigation as to 
why these phenomena continue is necessary. The increasing demographic heterogeneity 
(Kumar & Seay, 2011) has augmented the necessity to recognize and address the 
continuing prevalence of outgroup discrimination, strained race relations, and racism. 
The unreasoned fear of anything perceived as foreign or strange is known to foster 
xenophobic reactions to outgroup members (Ommundsen et al., 2013). Based on these 
circumstances, there is a call to enhance individuals’ adaptation and tolerance to a more 
culturally and socially complex society. 
According to D’Souza (1996), individuals must cognitively process themselves 
and their in-group as being distinguishable based on the existence of biological 
differences. Additionally, D’Souza (1996) described the belief of superiority and 
inferiority and the individuals holding of these ranks as being innate or intrinsic. These 
beliefs are linked to the EEE processes as a whole and involve a proposition about the 
existence of racial essences (Roets & VanHiel, 2011b). Appiah (1990) and Ikuenobe 
(2010) argued the individual with extrinsic racial categorization and xenophobic 
tendencies suffers from a cognitive incapacity that is manifested by the resistance of 
contradictory information due to the freezing of the EEE processes. 
When the outgroup is seen as possessing more entativity, the tendency for 
increased negative evaluations exists. Related to the development of xenophobia, the 
presumed entativity of the outgroup is perceived as being unified and working in an 





et al., 2013). This study served as an important catalyst into the continuing examination 
and dialog regarding multicultural psychosocial education to be required from 
Kindergarten through higher education. The socializing behaviors and xenophobic 
attitudes of individuals may be reduced by increasing familiarity with members of 
outgroups under consistent conditions, and offering the perceiver the ability to not allow 
for the subconscious freezing of the epistemic system.  
Transition 
The cognitive processes of EEE have been known to be instrumental in the quick 
seizing and freezing of information in an attempt to prevent and guard against ambiguity 
and contradictory information. Having seized upon this information, the individual 
guards against or freezes out any new or contradictory information. The malleability of 
the individual’s EEE processes had yet to be addressed. 
With the introduction of multicultural psychosocial material, the epistemic 
essentialist driven processes of the individual’s currently held thoughts for the 
psychosocial norm for race may become malleable; however, there has been a lack of 
research on this topic. This study focused on the specific neurocognitive processing of the 
EEE system following the introduction and inclusion of culturally rich psychosocial 
material. The results of this research may provide valuable information about the 
individual’s neurocognitive perceptions for the psychosocial norm for race and the 
flexibility of those perceptions and cognitive processes. Chapter 2 provides a 
comprehensive literature review on epistemic essentialism and entativity as the processes 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter includes a review of the current and relevant literature on epistemic 
processes, including the essentialist theory of race and its components. Included as well 
are the elements of essentialism, the elements of the essentialist belief process (both 
psychological and genetic), the essentialist processes and race relations, essentialism and 
social and racial categories, neuropsychological processes as they relate to race, racial 
categorization, stereotyping, and prejudice. 
Additionally, social class and essentialism, social cognitive tendencies, and causal 
attribution are explored. Thirdly, xenophobia, the belief in essentialist social 
determination, the lay theories of essentialism, gender differences, gender and 
essentialism, and subjective essentialism are investigated. Lastly, this chapter includes 
prior research regarding essentialism as it relates to epistemic cognition, epistemic 
attitudes, epistemic freezing. Further, the relationship between cultural neuroscience and 
cognitive incapacity, intergroup perception, and cognitive incapacity as they lead to 
essentialism are investigated. Chapter 2 also addresses the relevance of racism, 
xenophobia, epistemic cognition, the epistemic need for closure, and attitudes. 
Additionally, epistemic seizing and freezing, entitativity, culture and neuroscience as 
they relate to EEE are reviewed. Finally, the methods of the measurement of the EEE 
processes are reviewed. 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to understand the epistemic essentialist 
entitativity (EEE) processes and their malleability through the introduction of 





research regarding how, or whether, the individual’s exposure to this type of curriculum 
contributes to any differences in his or her EEE level of processing.  
Literature Search Strategy 
A thorough review of the literature was conducted from 2012 to 2014 on research 
dating from 1954 to 2014. Included were the PsycINFO, PubMed, BIOMED Central 
Neuroscience, SocINDEX, and BIOMED databases. The key words and phrases searched 
were epistemics, essentialist, essentialism, racism, stereotyping, outgroup prejudice, 
epistemic essentialist entitativity, neuro-psychological judgment, prejudice, unfreezing, 
PET scan, magnetic response imaging (MRI) bias, neuropsychology, prejudice, and need 
for closure. Literature was retrieved from Walden University, University of Saint Francis 
Indiana, and Indiana University Medical School.  
Theoretical Foundation 
Considering the essentialist theory of race (Chao et al., 2013), this study was 
grounded in part on the premise that the individual believes that race is a stable and fixed 
natural entity. Furthermore, the theory posits the individual considers race as an entity 
that is biologically based and is the fixed essence of an individual. The seizing and 
freezing of the epistemic cognitive processes, the EEE, according to this theory, involve 
the individual’s processing of essentialism (Chao et al., 2013) and is related to the 
cognitive motivation of the belief of the psychosocial norm for race. 
The components of the essentialist theory of race were described by Chao et al. 
(2013) as depicted by an individual driven by the epistemic process of essentialism. 
Essentialism, as a component of the cognitive epistemic processes, references the 





that serve as social reality (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Entitativity, included in this 
theory, encompasses the individual’s propensity to determine the identity and category of 
others, and in turn interpret them as fundamentally alike (Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013). As 
a sector of social cognitive neuroscience, these are collectively referred to as the 
epistemic essentialist entitativity (EEE) processes (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). 
Intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) proposes the individual 
who works with and learns about outgroup members in a consistent manner will develop 
more positive concepts about them. The unfreezing or malleability of the EEE processes 
are explored by the introduction of the face-to-face multicultural psychosocial 
educational course regarding differing cultures, ethnicities, and psychosocial norms. 
Cognitive NFC assists in the guidance of the theoretical aspects of this research as this 
theory addresses the individual cognitive epistemic need to procure convenient and quick 
judgments of members of perceived outgroups. This process relates to cognitive 
essentialism (Rangel & Keller, 2011) and assists in exploring the possibility of 
unfreezing and/or the malleability of the EEE processes.  
Literature Review 
Epistemic Processes 
The epistemic processes are epistemological attitudes and beliefs that are 
components of the individual metacognitive systems of knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 
1997). Richter and Schimd (2010) described the personal epistemology systems of an 
individual as those that consist of their beliefs about the nature and processes of knowing 
in which the epistemic strategies serve as knowledge-based regulatory validation of the 





motivated to make ethnic categorizations, which they believe to be a social reality (Roets 
& Van Hiel, 2011b). 
Epistemological processes encompass the individual’s beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge and personally knowing. These beliefs can be regarded as the “subjective 
equivalent of epistemology” (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b, p. 54). Kienhues, Bromme, and 
Stahl (2008) described the theoretical philosophy of epistemology as one that is 
concerned with the criteria, characteristics, and justification characteristics the individual 
considers prior to engaging in essentialist thoughts and beliefs.  
When comparing epistemological beliefs to metacognitive knowledge, Flavell 
(1979) noted that individuals experience like beliefs in the coherent, complete, and 
adequate beliefs systems in knowledge and knowing. Earlier models of epistemological 
beliefs show evidence of the epistemological and the psychological processes of 
metacognitive knowledge as those that are based upon the major theories that draw upon 
epistemological beliefs and those beliefs that are related to psychological mechanisms 
(Richter & Schmid, 2010). Epistemic motives inspire essentialist beliefs about racial 
groups according to Roets and Van Hiel (2011b). Additionally, Roets and Van Hiel 
(2011b) argued the epistemic essentialist entitativity (EEE) processes inspire essentialist 
beliefs about racial groups that influence the individual’s “color blind” ideology. 
Epistemic cognition (EC) is a significant component of human cognition and the 
epistemological process. This cognitive process instigates the epistemic beliefs in which 
an individual will view beliefs about current knowledge as that of knowing (Braten, Britt, 
Stromso, & Rouet, 2011). Chinn, Buckland, and Samarapungavan (2011) described EC is 





epistemic beliefs of the individual. Additionally, the processes of epistemic cognition 
have been approached as a multidimensional structure of independent beliefs (Chinn et 
al., 2011).  
Epistemic Signaling Systems 
Self-esteem is considered to be an epistemic signaling system the individual 
accesses in an attempt to assess his or her global self-esteem. In other words, the 
individual will attempt to assess his or her understanding of the presented social reality 
(Stinson et al., 2010). The individual’s self-esteem, as argued by Stinson et al. (2010), is 
one in which the epistemic signaling system alerts the individual as to whether the social 
feedback he or she perceives receiving is consistent with his or her chronically perceived 
values. 
Leary and Baumeister (2000) argued the individual who embraces the epistemic 
acceptance signaling system will in turn exhibit a classification structure in which the 
signaling of acceptance or the rejection of phenomena changes the person’s self-esteem. 
This change, according to the self-verification theory (Swann, 1997), suggests that the 
person has an epistemic signaling system that notifies the individual whether social 
feedback is consistent or inconsistent with his or her global self-esteem. This epistemic 
neuropsychological signaling system indicates the individual’s global self-esteem is 
based upon the ability to regulate his or her social thoughts and behaviors (Stinson et al., 
2010). When unsure or faced with an ambiguous situation, individuals with low global 
self-esteem will respond with avoidance, whereas those with a higher level of global self-
esteem will respond with a healing or mending response (Stinson et al., 2010). This 





behaviors and social outcomes and base their interpersonal behavioral and cognitive 
thought processes based on that perceived reality. 
Epistemic certainty has been characterized by Swann and Schroeder (1995) as the 
individual’s feelings of certainty, control, and epistemic confidence, while the individual 
who is experiencing epistemic confusion will feel uncertainty, puzzlement, and 
psychological discomfort. The epistemic system may provide signals when a discrepancy 
between the individual’s current perceived social feedback is processed. This will then 
activate the person’s self-regulatory efforts in an attempt to reduce the perceived 
discrepancy, which has been shown to imitate the regulatory effort to decrease any 
perceived discrepancies between the self-view and social feedback (Stinson et al., 2010). 
Epistemic Attitudes 
Epistemological attitudes serve the individual with an important function in 
regulating the use of epistemological strategies. These may include knowledge-based 
validity of the received information, as well as the individual assessing internal 
consistency (Richter & Schmid, 2010). The epistemic attitudes and processes are 
described as cognitive activities that take place when the individual is faced with 
interrelated topics, including the source from which the knowledge originated. The 
current belief system, perceived evidence, perceived truth, and an understanding via 
cognitive processing mechanisms are all involved in epistemological attitudes (Chinn et 
al., 2011). 
Epistemological attitudes are found to affect self-regulated learning, which in turn 
can lead to an individual’s rapid attempt to engage in essentialist thinking and 





individual’s self-regulated learning strategy (Richter & Schmid, 2010). Chinn et al. 
(2011) described a network of epistemic cognitive processes in which five 
distinguishable components are recognized. Included are the goals individuals adopt in 
which they pay special attention to the inquiry into a situation and the results of that 
inquiry as they perceive them. Additionally, the simple or complex structure of the 
individual’s thought of knowing holds a significant role in the processing of information 
(Chinn et al., 2011). 
Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, and De Grada (2006) proposed the cognitive 
epistemic processes as those in which the individual is dependent upon epistemic 
authority when faced with ambiguity. As individuals develop within their socio-
psychological environment, they will move away from considering the parents and other 
adults as epistemic authorities and will in turn move toward their peers and perceived in-
group members. This move promotes the attempt to collectively form their opinions 
while the group consensus is sought to define a personal social reality. 
The source of knowledge plays an important role in the individual’s justification 
for his or her beliefs. The attitudes of believing, doubting, and endorsements of 
information intake are all considered (Chinn et al., 2011). Virtues and vices, as explained 
by Chinn et al. (2011), are to be considered when assessing the individual’s perceived 
epistemic goals. These include the epistemic processes of open-mindedness and 








Epistemic Need for Closure 
The need for cognitive closure (NFC) is considered a cognitively accessible 
construct and a significant epistemic motivational component that affects the fundamental 
epistemic social nexus (Kruglanski et al., 2006). The NFC is identified as a major 
epistemic motivation associated with an individual’s judgment and decision-making 
processes (Chiu et al., 2000; Pierro, Kruglanski, & Raven, 2012). This epistemic process 
has been defined by Kruglanski et al. (2006) as the individual’s desire for a stable and 
firm answer to what has been perceived as an ambiguous or confusing situation. Webster 
and Kruglanski (1994) expounded on the definition by asserting that individuals who 
have a higher need for epistemic closure will seek closure quickly to an ambiguous 
stimulus in line with the immediacy principle. The process is included in the permanence 
principle of adhering to that quick decision without acknowledging and considering 
alternatives. The individual will seize the most accessible cognitive alternative and freeze 
their current mindset. 
Individuals with a strong need for cognitive closure have been found to have an 
urgent and permanent seizure of the information leading to epistemic freezing (Pierro et 
al., 2012). These individuals that have been considered impervious to any additional 
relevant information and are prone to making strong judgmental commitments. 
Kruglanski et al. (2006) described the epistemic NFC as a nonspecific representation of 
an individual construct that determines how an individual will process information and 
adjudicate personal judgment. Kruglanski et al. (2006) proposed the possibility that the 
epistemic NFC induces and enhances group-centrism, a behavioral syndrome defined as a 





uniformity, rejection of perceived deviants, resistance to change, and the perpetuation of 
group norms.  
The concept of the epistemic need for cognitive closure has been identified as an 
important epistemic process assisting in the understanding of an individual’s motivation 
of utilizing subjective knowledge and beliefs about the social world, as well as 
knowledge construction and protection (Kruglanski & Webster; 1996; Roets & Van Hiel, 
2010). The individual’s epistemic NFC leads to essentialism (Chinn et al, 2011). Found 
to be a reliable progressive source in an individual’s cognition and social inquiry, NFC is 
thought to be based on the individual’s epistemic needs and desires. Additionally, this 
epistemic cognitive framework has been found to assist in the individual’s ability to 
differentiate social dimensions. This has been considered when exploring the individual’s 
strategies for learning new information and the sources the individual seeks out to gain 
such information (Chinn et al., 2011). These processes, within the field of epistemic 
thought processes, have been studied by philosophers in an attempt to identify the 
interconnectedness of both concepts and issues that have influenced a person’s epistemic 
processes and beliefs (Chinn et al., 2011). 
Not unlike metacognitive knowledge, Richter and Schmid (2010) argued that 
epistemological beliefs are similar to stable learner characteristics in which the individual 
will exert a profound amount of influence on the individual learning process. 
Motivational states have been known to mediate this influence via the epistemic 






Motivational states in an individual are known to mediate the epistemic processes. 
Discussed by Richter and Schmid (2010) the level of motivation has been found that 
although possibly opposed to an individual’s current standpoint it may continue to oppose 
the gathering and learning of contradictory information. When separate knowing had an 
effect on the use of epistemic strategies, it was found to depend upon the objective 
characteristics and the individual’s familiarity with the information that was gathered 
(Richter & Schmid, 2010).  
As an epistemic process, the cognitive NFC is identified in those who prefer 
predictability and stable knowledge across varying circumstances. Those with a high 
NFC are correlated with the individual feeling discomfort with ambiguity when 
experiencing aversive situations that are simultaneously void of closure (Roets & Van 
Hiel, 2011b). 
Lalwani (2009) argued an important process in obtaining closure is the 
individual’s need to possess epistemically secure information when using judgment and 
referencing cultural groups. Furthermore, those with high NFC grasp influences and often 
utilize perceived cultural differences in social responding to secure cognitive decisions. 
Additionally, in two studies conducted by Lalwani (2009) it was suggested that 
individuals who were influenced by the NFC, with regards to socially desirable reactions 
to cultural differences, were affected simultaneously by two different processes. The first 
is indicated by increasing the individual’s tendency to engage in “culture-congruence” by 
responding in a socially desirable manner. Secondly, and simultaneously, is the 
individual that is shown to have a decreasing tendency to engage in cultural-incongruent 





Kruglanski and Webster (1991) proposed the individual with a high level of NFC 
reacts in a significantly more negative way towards anyone who has undermined the 
ability of a group to make consensual decisions.  Rubin et al. (2011) argued this 
phenomenon could not explain the NFC that relates to deviant bias, although it does offer 
alternative explanations to Kruglanski and Webster’s (1991) argument. Rubin et al. 
(2011) suggested those with a high NFC may become frustrated when the need to 
maintain structured social categories is present. Additionally, Rubin et al. (2011) 
presented this as a possibility of being secondary to the individual feeling disdain in their 
inability to maintain a well-ordered and organized social situation and categorization. 
The epistemic NFC assists the individual in providing the self with a desirable 
judgment that is made quickly and easily while considering any collateral information as 
an inconvenience (Rangel & Keller, 2011). The epistemic system additionally protects 
the individual’s information and assists in making the information or knowledge 
permanent. This “freezing” of the information is done in an effort to strengthen the 
consolidation of the individual’s knowledge and block any perceived contradictory 
information from being obtained (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). When attempting to create 
permanence, the epistemic system protects the current knowledge and disallows the 
ability to free up the process of knowing with regards to the current level of perceived 
knowledge regarding the outgroup subject.  
A significant personal cognitive NFC is the individual’s desire to have closure 
quickly and enduringly. The individual with a strong NFC will tend to seize upon 
judgment and information, and in turn, be closed off to any additional information 





information with a desire of comfort and result in a quick and rapid NFC that will be 
more suspicious of other possibilities and options (Chiu et al., 2000; Webster, & 
Kruglanski, 1994). 
Chiu et al. (2000) described motivated cultural cognition as that of an individual 
who seeks to respond to an ambiguous social event by intensifying their reliance upon 
implicit theory. Individuals with a heightened NFC base their judgments on 
predominantly pre-existing cues and knowledge as opposed to any subsequent 
information. Furthermore, Kruglanski and Webster (1996) argued the NFC, when 
heightened, relies upon more stereotypes instead of case specific information due to 
stereotypes being based on pre-existing knowledge structures. The overuse of the pre-
existing cues allows the individual to justify the tendency to use the perceived knowledge 
as accurate even when different subsequent evidence is presented.  
Epistemic Seizing and Freezing 
Pirttila-Backman and Kajanne (2001) argued the early stages of exploratory 
development in the individual acts as a catalyst for epistemic development, and in 
adulthood the need to explore any contradictive information is not a crucial need. The 
NFC motivates the individual in a way that may affect how information drawn from 
social interaction is processed. Kruglanski and Webster (1996) described two processes 
as a result of this effect, the act of seizing and freezing of information as one that is 
preceded by the individual’s urgency and permanence tendencies. Those with a 
heightened NFC will attempt to avoid discomfort from bothersome ambiguous 
information and quickly seize the perceived information. The permanence tendency 





against processing any new information. Kruglanski and Webster (1996) presented the 
process as one of the “seizing and freezing” of information that may affect not only the 
individual’s information processing, but also the individual’s ability in processing the 
mediation of multiple social psychological information processing systems. 
Based upon these theories the individual may feel more assured of their 
judgments and feel no need to process any additional information prior to committing to 
the judgment. This lack of additional situational hypotheses seeking leads to the seizing 
of the information. The person is comfortable and confident enough with the seized 
information sensing the credibility, plausibility, and certainty will then lead to epistemic 
freezing (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). 
The freezing process represents the avoidance of any further dissolution of the 
information possessed when the individual is confronted with new information. The 
blocking of new information is an attempt to maintain consensual judgments. When 
freezing information, and preserving it for future use, the individual has a tendency to 
prefer opinions that will potentially be unchallenged and associate with others who share 
the same. This surrounding of similar-minded others will additionally allow for positive 
regard for those groups and in turn allow negative feelings toward those with different or 
opposing opinions for fear of disrupting the consensus (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). 
Previously formed stereotypes, from a social psychological perspective, have 
been noted to offer early cues when considering formed attitudes that include stereotypes, 
prejudice, and memories. Thought to supersede prior knowledge, configurations of the 
seizing and freezing of memories suggest the individual may utilize a pre-existing 





case-specific information known to substantially slow down closure and thought to be 
stereotypes that are highly accessible in the individual’s memory (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1999). 
Kruglanski, Peri, and Zakai (1991), described the crystallization stage as the 
epistemic process in which the individual’s opinion is solidified, thereby enhancing the 
NFC during the pre-crystallization stage leading to a seizing intensity. In the post-
crystallization stage the individual who has a heightened NFC will then strengthen the 
process of freezing leading the individual to a sense of gratification. Individuals are found 
to experience a decreased level of confidence in their judgment prior to crystallization 
whereas the individual in the post-crystallization phase have a relatively increased sense 
of confidence. While attempting to seize information, the extent and intensity in which a 
person will seek out information is known to be more aggressive and intense than when 
attempting to freeze information and judgments. The individual attempting to seize and 
freeze information, as explained by Kruglanski et al. (1991), results in an increase in 
epistemic reluctance to consider and search for additional or new information.  
Kruglanski and Webster (1996) studied the epistemic process of freezing in 
individuals with a heightened sense of NFC who possessed a prior opinion and found that 
a considerable amount of disagreeing and conflict arose between those with a prior 
opinions and with those who held a different opinion. This “fight rather than switch” 
process is found to be potentially dysfunctional in those individuals who could not, or 
would not, exert the energy in what is considered an arduous task of further information 





functional autonomy from those with differing input is seemingly shut down and 
shunned.  
The NFC is an area of the epistemic processes which is focused upon identifying 
the cognitive foundations of prejudice. Included, in addition to Kruglanski & Webster 
(1996), is the theory for Need for Structure (NFS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Both of 
these approaches focus upon the individual’s epistemic processing. For example, the 
person’s tendency to incorrectly process incoming information. These processes and 
outcomes have been linked to the person’s cognitive processing style which have been 
indicated as being a pre-cursor to stereotyping and prejudiced behaviors towards 
disparaged groups (Hong, Chao, & No, 2009)  
Hong et al. (2009) described the understanding that a person may have regarding 
the pure nature of race creates a lens in which he or she will perceive the 
acknowledgement and understanding of racial differences, and in turn, hypothesize a 
racial realness or reality. In turn, this will lead to the individual’s personal way of 
encoding, representing, and organizing the information when it is related to race.  
Epistemics and Emotions 
To decide whether to engage in systematic thinking the individual must be 
epistemically motivated (Kruglanski, 1989). Individual differences have been found to 
affect a person’s epistemic motivation (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003) and an intensified 
level of epistemic motivation has been shown, according to Stuhlmacher and 
Champagne, (2000) to decrease the level in which the individual will utilize a selective 





influence this processing of information by way of the individual’s current emotional 
state (Van Kleef, Homoan, Beersma, Knippenberg, Knippenberg, & Damen, 2009). 
The processing of information and the strategy used to process information is 
dependent upon the person’s epistemic motivation and emotions and in turn, the person’s 
basis for their behavior is on the preponderant affective state (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
This epistemic metacognitive process is considered the manager of the cognitive 
resources. The individual will engage this epistemic action and direct it to cognition 
(Brink & Lilljenfors, 2013). 
Emotion and attention were described by Brinck (2001) as a perceptional 
component of metacognition which institutes the “experimental” element of 
metacognition involving the individual’s emotions and attention, as well as their beliefs 
and feelings. The link between emotions and intergroup relations, as based upon 
functional theories is consistent with the idea that emotions can function as adaptive 
mechanisms and are thereby linked to the production of clear cognitive, behavioral, and 
physiological responses as are perceived to be challenging to environmental stimuli 
(Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009). 
The appraisal of groups, in particular those groups unrelated to intergroup 
relations, affect the information processing of the perceiver. Serving as internal signals, 
in an attempt to assist the individual to steer through outgroup threats, emotions have 
been shown to influence an individual’s processing of information regarding outgroups. 
As argued by Bodenhausen et al. (2001) not unlike NFC, rapid action is influenced by the 
emotion of anger which promotes the individual’s heuristic style of information 





quickly satisfy the individual’s cognitive and emotional signals. Sadness and the need for 
caution, as argued by Dasgupta et al. (2009) are the only emotions shown to promote 
information processing which did not rely heavily on stereotypes. 
Described by Koriat (2000) this process consists of information and theory-based 
judgments in which the individual will access a form of cognition which entails a high 
degree of consciousness and control. When epistemic actions are felt to be needed, the 
individual will desire a “distance to the goal” (Brinck & Liljenfors, 2013, p. 90). This 
action being directed toward the person’s epistemic cognitive functions will “alert” them 
when an inadequate cognitive goal is being reached. The individual will then implement a 
plan to enhance and re-organize the information and quickly search for new information, 
in an attempt to repair the perceived insufficiency. 
The social perspective on epistemic processes was investigated by Van Kleef et 
al. (2009) and it was proposed that emotion is a by-product of the epistemic process 
which can influence the person by acting as a catalyst in conveying information. Found to 
have an effect on in-group relations, socially based epistemic processes have been 
investigated as the processes pertain to outgroup relations as well. The interpersonal 
effects of the individual’s emotions can largely develop with isolation, further solidifying 
the freezing effect of the epistemic process. Dependent upon the individual’s motivation 
epistemic processes, emotions are found to influence judgment and decision making, both 
affecting outgroup and in-group relations (Van Kleef et al., 2009). 
Finding the individual’s epistemic emotions being developed within isolation, 
Van Kleef et al. (2009) argued he or she may be guided by not only their own emotions, 





be relevant to future research regarding the continuing attempt to keep the epistemic 
processes malleable regardless of the mind-set and emotions of others. 
Proposing emotional contagion co-ordinates with the individual’s contagion and 
interacts with social circumstances, Keltner and Haidt (1999) posited the reactions of an 
individual are predictive of the person’s level of epistemic motivation. Social information 
and the emotional reaction of others have most commonly only been investigated in a 
social context. However, the emotional reaction of an individual may be dependent upon 
the dynamic appraisal process. Van Kleef et al. (2009) described by Allport (1953) an 
individual will make an effort to explain if their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are 
prejudiced by true, actual, imagined, or implied preferences of others. 
Social preferences and social dimensions, as described by Manstead and Fischer 
(2001) may be incorporated and specified as an emotional response in which the concept 
of social appraisal introduced.as behaviors, feelings, and thoughts. The association 
between cognitive emotional appraisal and emotional experience was described by 
Mumenthaler and Sander (2012) as one in which the individual will assess the emotional 
event and at the same time be affected by the way others feel about the same situation. 
This epistemic occurence was investigated (Mumenthaler & Sander, 2012) and found to 
influence the individual’s self-reported emotions based upon the presented event. 
Functional theories can also be relied upon in the consistent linking of emotion 
and intergroup relations. The linking is recognized as taking place when emotion is 
considered a mechanism which is flexible and malleable, in an attempt to create 
responses to external stimuli. The sought after responses result from the individuals 





physiological, and behavioral actions (Dasgupta et al., 2009). Furthermore, Fisk (1998) 
described emotions as influencing an individual’s cognitive processes when assessing 
outgroup members. 
Promoting the reliance on stereotyping judgments, through epistemic processes, 
Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer (1994) argued both the emotions of anger and 
happiness are correlative. Dasgupta et al. (2009) investigated the primary way in which 
emotions increase stereotyping, finding that the emotions, anger and disgust had similar 
effects upon the individual’s implicit attitude toward outgroup members. Implicit 
attitudes and stereotypes commonly function within the individual’s subconscious. 
Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, and Hodson (2002) maintained this to be especially noted 
in aversive racism. Finding larger effect sizes in a 2009 study, Dasgupta et al. argued the 
individual will show an increased level of implicit bias against outgroups. This occurence 
was also noted even when the individual had not identified any previously existing biases 
against the group, until experiencing the emotions of disgust or anger. Additionally, a 
significant correlation was found between the incidental emotion of disgust and implicit 
anti-gay bias as well as bias against individuals who identified as Arabs as presented by 
Dasgupta et al.(2009). Dasgupta et al. (2009) argued, the significant impact of emotions 
on implicit outgroup evaluations, especially when implicit biases are applicable to the 
stereotypes and threats the individual has attached to the target group.  
Essentialism 
Using the inductive potential, the first element of the essentialist belief process 
has been identified as the process in which the individual uses inferences to allow the 





considered as having an existence, reality, or ontological status which allows the 
perceiver to cognitively process members of another social group as having an underlying 
“sameness” or coherence which is immutable (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Rangel & Keller, 
2011; Yzerbyt et al., 1997).  
Haslam, Rothchild, & Ernst (2000) noted typically identified within the aspects 
associated with essentialist beliefs were categories comprising several dimensions of 
cognitive processing. One dimension is “judged naturalness” considered the process in 
which the individual judges the naturalness, immutability, and stability of another 
category. Further categories identified include, “rated uniformity” and “exclusiveness” 
(Haslam et al., 2000, p. 117).  
Psychological Essentialism 
Essentialism or essentialist thinking has been defined as the belief that all 
members of a particular social category, share stagnant, unchangeable, and a fixed 
underlying nature (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Essentialist thinking is exhibited by an 
individual who infers another’s core characteristics are easily identifiable by their group 
membership. According to Rangel and Keller (2011), the individual does not typically 
base their beliefs on a biological basis, but upon a person’s characteristics. It is more 
often a result of identifying the proposed correlates and consequences of psychological 
essentialism from which a person will draw upon to identify group membership. This 
would include the observed behaviors of others, the habitual attributes, and disposition 
assumed to be associated with the individual’s upbringing and background by assisting in 






Kashima et al. (2005) described the process of essentialism as one in which a 
person is considered to have the same essence-like and unchangeable characteristics, 
even more than those within the social group in which the individual was considered to 
have equal agency. As long ago as 1958, Campbell questioned whether essentialism was 
to be considered as the ontological status of social groups. Campbell argued the 
individual possessed particular “wholes” or sums which make up entities where others do 
not. Entitativity, claimed Campbell, (1958) was simply the degree in which a person will 
have the nature of an entity, or in other words, a real and tangible existence. Kashima et 
al. (2005) argued this concept was often taken for granted by which the individual 
believed others are more a real entity than that of a social group. 
As long ago as 1924, Floyd Allport made references to social psychology as a 
practice in which the belief in the philosophical study of the being and its nature, 
existence, and reality, or ontological status of an individual is present. This as opposed to 
groups, argued Allport as reported by Yzerbyt, Judd, and Corneille (2004) was not 
essentially encompassing the psychology of human beings and should not be categorized 
as a contraindication to the psychology of the individual themselves. However, Yzerbyt, 
et al. (2004) presented Entitativity as a useful method to clarify how the ontological 
concept indicates the extent to which a group of individuals is a true and real entity. 
Two aspects of entititativity are essentialism and perceived agency (Brewer, 
Hong, & Li, 2004). Psychological essentialism according to Hamilton (2007) was 
presented in 1992 by Rothbart and Taylor as an aspect of social categories, race and 
gender for instance, that are perceived by the individual to have their existence deeply 





upon surface appearances and causal connections that cannot be changed by human 
intervention.  
Kashima et al. (2005) described essentialism as the process in which an individual 
relates the inductive potential of another based upon one observation. This observation is 
attributed to a single social category and may be considered as one which makes the 
members of that social category analogous to each other, both in their appearance, but 
behaviors as well. This perceived group entitativity is utilized to form group impressions 
as opposed to individual perceptions.  
An additional form of essentialism is that of conceptualized thoughts in which 
there is perceived inalterability or the belief the properties of the social entity targeted are 
not changeable by human intervention. Those individuals who prescribe to the entity 
theory are apt to believe the underlying characteristic of a social group or entity is the 
essence which is viewed as causal for the group’s appearance and behaviors. This entity 
is therefore incapable of changing the underlying group membership, either easily or at 
all (Kashima et al., 2005). 
Biological Basis for Essentialism 
An element of the essentialist lay theory provided an explanation of the causal 
nature of essentialist beliefs according to Rangel and Keller (2011). These authors 
suggested a key element of conceptualization was essentialism and causal factors. Bastian 
and Haslam (2006) referred to this as a genetic determination factor of essentialism and 
explained how the lay theory of endorsing essentialism explains social perception.  
As shown in research conducted by Bastian and Haslam (2006), Hoffman and 





introduced both the plausibility of the reference to the genetic basis for essentialist 
theorizing as well. Additionally, these authors argued that the biological basis for the 
individual assigning attributes through essentialist processing was equal to the perception 
of naturalness. 
Essentialist Process and Race 
The essentialist theory of race addresses the theory that individuals view other 
races in totality, as an essence in which all person belonging to that race and share 
immutable and unalterable physical and psychological markings (Chao et al., 2013). 
When the essentialist processes are accessed, the individual is likely to determine the 
identity and category of the outgroup member as fundamentally alike. According to the 
theory, they will then use this identity to determine “inferences”, also referred to as 
entitativity (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). 
When discussing the essentialism of race, Hong et al. (2009) argued the individual 
will deny the “real” race as a racial essence. For some, contended Hong et al. (2009) the 
average person will often invent racial classification in an attempt to provide convenient 
and readily accessible labels for persons who are perceived to be unequal between 
groups. Some individuals will simply utilize the racial classifications as a form of 
convenience and quick NFC processes in an attempt to categorize others when social 
circumstances may be potentially challenged (Fairchild, Yee, Wyatt, & Weizmann, 
1995). 
Race as a social construct may be viewed as one which is arbitrarily fashioned by 
the individual secondary to social circumstances and historical events. This process being 





individual observes between racial outgroups as those who do not represent the inherent 
differences between groups (Hong et al., 2009). Essentialism is considered a process in 
which the individual who believes in this feature of social group support the notion the 
social group can never be changed and therefore support and tend to form more robust 
stereotypes (Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001). 
Essentialism and Social Categories 
Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) argued that race and ethnicity might just be the 
most relied upon of social categories in modern times. Essentialism has come to be 
recognized as a productive catalyst in the activation and application of stereotypes 
(Pereira, Estramiana, & Gallo, 2010). Dependent upon the visually observed 
characteristics of another, the individual seeks categorization based upon clearly 
observed appearances. Visual characteristics in turn, allow the perceiver to assume all 
members appearing alike share the identical inherent essences (Piereira et al., 2010). 
Yzerbyt and Rogier (2001) claimed the essentialism process provides for the individual to 
perceive both similarities and differences in the outgroup member. 
When observing the differences between categorization theories and essentialism, 
Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner (1993) discussed essentialism as the by-product process 
in which assumptions of similarities are made as a result of categorization. Based upon 
these assumptions of essence, those belonging to the group will also be assumed to have a 
deep quality of “likeness” such as in behaviors and values (Pierira et al., 2010).  
Social categorization via the essentialist process has been found to further support 
the inferences an individual makes regarding which shared group members are thought to 





2010). Social psychologists, such as Medin and Ortony (1998) considered essentialism to 
be a psychological process in which the individual’s representation of others reflects their 
belief that others all share the same essence. Cognitive psychologists such as Hirschfield 
(1996) argued that the cognitive biases an individual maintains allows for the creation of 
social categories as well. 
The individual’s essentialist beliefs may manifest through the implicit assumption 
that individuals possess regarding the structure and categories that surround them in the 
world (Gelman, Clay, & Gottfried, 1994). Haslam (2011) commented on Dar-Nimrod 
and Heine’s 2011 research and claimed the findings provided a clear and articulate 
reasoning based upon the cognitive essentialist processing an individual engages in.  
Racial Essentialism 
Smith (2001) references racial essentialism as playing a significant role in the 
formation of prejudice. Ethnic nationalism according to Smith (2001) is one such form of 
psychological racial essentialism. Chao (2007) and No et al. (2008) discussed race as 
being a meaningful source of human division that was based upon the inferred essence of 
racial groups. It’s suggested by utilizing an individual’s race to engage in racial 
essentialism offers the person the opportunity to make judgment based upon what were 
believed to be fundamental and biologically clear differences. 
This process, maintain Chao (2007) and No et al. (2008) offers the perceiver 
assistance in understanding and making sense of their social world by allowing race to 
indicate a member’s abilities and traits. This social psychological reasoning regarding 
stereotyping and prejudice led researchers, Yzerbyt et al. (1997) to theorize the traditional 





cognitive strategies used by an individual to simplify the processing of social 
information. Additionally, these cognitive strategies are thought to serve as a functional 
role for stereotypes by assisting the individual in rationalizing social situations (Yzerbyt 
et al., 1997). 
The stereotyping process is more than the individual viewing others attributes as a 
list associated with a particular social category. This will take place as well as the 
individual performing an all-encompassing and underlying explanation linking all 
attributes together. This linking process provides the individual an account for the 
category association between stereotypical attributes and category labels. Social 
inequalities refer to unjust treatment that is rationalized based upon the Yzerbyt et al. 
(1997) explanation of essentialist behaviors and beliefs. Additionally, it’s known the 
individual who makes essentialist inferences is more apt to harbor aversive racism, a 
covert and modern form of discrimination (Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013). 
Culture and Essentialism 
When perceiving an individual in an entitative way, in psychological essentialism, 
the individual is clearly perceived to be more entitative than others. When the 
individual’s characteristics are perceived as being more consistent between two 
observations, as well as perceived as being more difficult to change, the individual will 
identify with these characteristics more so than those of another family or group 
membership. This was found to be especially prevalent in English-speaking and 
European cultures (Kashima et al., 2005). 
When assessing the essentialism of social targets, culture appears to play a role in 





cultures, East Asian cultures, and English speaking cultures, the tendency to view an 
individual with possessing a greater perceived consistency is found predominantly in the 
English speaking cultures (Kashima et al., 2005). When assessing the perceived agency, 
those individuals within the English speaking cultures find the individual to have the 
most naturally attributed thoughts, intentions, yet for perceived inalterability, the culture 
does not appear to show a strong correlation, nor does perceived inalterability when 
considering the culture of the actors. This is thought to propose the individual is more 
essentialized than that of a group (Kashima et al., 2005). 
Essentialism and Racial Categorization 
Although not widely researched, the link between racial essentialism and racial 
categorization has been identified as an emerging neuroscience of culture and as an 
emerging field in social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, cultural psychology, and 
essentialism driven behaviors (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Rule, Freeman, & Ahbad, 
2013). However, racial categorization includes important psychological aspects and 
racialized perceptions (Chao et al., 2013) and is being researched and explored more at 
the present time. 
In one study, Chao (2000) investigated the individual’s tendency and willingness 
to categorize others as racially distinct through racial categorization, as one influencing 
several psychological aspects of race-based categorization (Chao et al., 2013). Haslam 
(2011) discussed the essentialist way of cognitive processing had, and will, have negative 
implications for social behaviors as well as social attitudes. The researchers proposed this 
theory following a path analysis being conducted using the structural equation modeling 





equation modeling software (EQS). This software specifically targeted to predict both 
perceived possibility of culture adoption by immigrants who serve as the minority and the 
level of identity threat the majority group participants experienced. Following the 
measurement, the results indicated those with essentialist beliefs had a significantly 
indirect effect for the “demand of culture adoption” (Zagefka et al., 2013, p. 63). 
Additionally, the SEM analysis indicated those with essentialist beliefs were 
simultaneously associated with negative perceptions about the possibility the outgroup 
members could eventually culturally adapt (Zagefka et al., 2013). 
The results of the path analysis indicated, according to Pereira et al. (2010), the 
majority group member desired the minority population to accomplish the impossible 
which was directly correlated with prejudice. Essentialism is thought to further encourage 
inequality in both social and political power of one group over another (Pereira et al., 
2010). These recent assessment tools have assisted in the current research on the 
epistemic process of essentialism and the measurement of its functioning. 
The hypocedent to racial classification begins as early as childhood when children 
whose parents are from differing racial groups are assigned to one racial group 
considered as subordinate (Chao et al., 2013). This has been suggested as making the 
hypocedent to racial classification harmful. Chao et al. (2013) and Brunsma (2006) 
argued racial categorization has been shown to have significant social implications dating 
back to the day of slavery and requires constant consideration in social psychology today.  
Essentialism and Stereotyping and Prejudice 
Prejudice is largely defined as a negative attitude toward an outgroup or the 





(2011) additionally described prejudice as a phenomenon in which society has addressed 
however interpersonal and race-based prejudice continues to exist. Furthermore, Conger, 
Dygdon, and Rolleck (2012) presented discrimination as a continuum in the employment 
arena, education, and housing front regardless of the current efforts of society to address 
these issues. Although strides have been made, the group-based solutions have not 
addressed the effects of racism and how to tackle the psychological aspects of adopting 
ways to look at the neuropsychological and cognitive aspects of this occurrence. 
When addressing perceived group homogeneity, epistemic processes, 
stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, and discriminatory tendencies, there has been 
distinguished an important association between the belief in social determination (BSD) 
theory and socio-cognitive concepts (Rangel & Keller, 2011). As early as childhood, 
Gelman and Wellman (1991) proposed the individual has a propensity for forming a 
“basic cognitive disposition” (p. 220) toward psychological essentialism. Essentialist 
beliefs, in which the individual believes in underlying social category “essences” being 
drawn upon in an attempt to assist in explain and rectifying sociocultural inequities is an 
important phenomenon (Keller, 2005). 
In previous research the essentialist cognitive process has been shown to be 
present in children who have a firm understanding of the essences of others, and the 
distinction of those who are felt to be in-group and outgroup members. This epistemic 
processes are also known to reinforce the hypocedent principle that serves to reinforce 
white privilege (Chao et al., 2013).  
The process of essentialism is one which is correlated with problematic social 





promotes social segregation (Haslam, 2011). Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) addressed the 
“broad implication” that cognitive essentialism has on understanding simple human 
diversity. Finding cognitive essentialism leads to the notion the individual’s epistemic 
process of essentialism warrants further review as it relates to being a catalyst to race 
relations. 
Essentialist processing allows the individual to “attach” social distinctions, which 
may result in forms of prejudice and discrimination (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). 
Further, Haslam (2011) suggested this type of essentialism is not only included when 
considering racial differences, but also when considering those who have mental 
disorders, gender differences, and sexuality differences.  
Although the empirical findings regarding the correlation between essentialist 
beliefs and prejudice are mixed, in 1954, researchers such as Allport speculated the 
individual with a prejudiced personality believed in an in-group essence which is a 
fundamental part of the prejudiced attitude. Additionally, the essentialist group 
justification is often the pre-cursor to outgroup as well as in-group hostility and conflict 
(Yzerbyt et al., 2004). In addition to the Keller (2005) research, a significant number of 
empirical studies have shown the individual who holds essentialist conceptions are more 
likely to endorse racial stereotypes, “misremember” minority group members through 
stereotypical notions, and many times, show less interest or concern in interacting with 
those from racial outgroups (Eberhardt, Dasgupta, & Banaszynski, 2003; Plaks, 
Stroessner, Dwek, & Sherman, 2001; Keller, 2005). 
When addressing the individual who endorse the color-blind theory, it is known 





enhancement of group membership categorization, therefore reducing the individual’s 
feeling of the need to “get to know” the individual as opposed to basing judgment upon 
the presented race. However, since the perception of the color-blind theory, social 
psychologists have been taking note of the backlash secondary to those individuals of 
color reporting feelings of being negated and dismissed as an entity (Rosenthal and Levy, 
2012).  
Belief in Essentialist Social Determination 
Differentiation between the acceptance and judging behaviors, both in the in-
group and outgroup scenario is described as a combined function of perceived similarity 
of the members. This is known to take place during the processing of outgroups as well 
as members who are considered to possess similar traits. This is accomplished by 
assigning the group members a category prototype. This assumption invites concern in 
that a group is confined to a perceived rational and moral social categorical 
representation. This categorical representation many times will result in a conflict of 
liberal norms and the injunction of generalization (Condor, 2006). 
Yrzebyt et al. (2007) underscored the subjective essentialist behaviors and beliefs 
are not always based upon the biological features of another, but also include the 
individual taking into consideration the factors that profoundly and permanently shape a 
person. This lay theory, referred to as BSD, introduced the possibility the individual’s 
personal characteristics are shaped by the “outside” person as they relate to an 
“immediate situation” (Rangel & Keller, 2011). Socially constructed thought processes 





This is also observed when an individual attributes behaviors based upon social influence 
in societal and economic contexts (Rangel & Keller, 2011).  
Investigating the individual’s tendency toward the BSD is known as the 
individual believing a person’s fundamental social character is shaped by social factors 
such as peer contact, upbringing, and socialization. Additionally, it is considered to 
constitute the belief that others personal essence is socially determined. This component 
of essentialist thinking is utilized by attaching ideological and epistemic processing, and 
in turn is involved in the tendency to stereotype others (Rangel & Keller, 2011). No et al. 
(2008) considered the belief in the social construction of race such as BSD suggests, 
implies race is an artificial grouping and is easily changed. 
The BSD is specific to the perception of group characterization based upon social 
features and results in group homogeneity. This process then assists the individual in 
providing final and unambiguous answers (Rangel & Keller, 2011). Additionally, BSD 
offers the justification to the group’s status in social hierarchy. The person with the belief 
of group homogeneity of social groups has a centralized belief pattern in which the 
specific social group is considered to have a common essence and underlying nature both 
leading to essentialism (Haslam et al., 2000; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). 
This lay theory is considered as one that can be related to social hierarchy and 
ideological constructs. These constructs enhance the viewed differences in individuals, 
groups, nations, and social dominance orientation (Rangel & Keller, 2011). Young, 
Sanchez, and Wilton (2013) argued that it is imperative to test the conditions that are 
indicative of essentialist thinking, and how and why they persist, as well as why 





Belief in Genetic Determinism 
An additional lay theory in essentialist perception is the belief of genetic 
determination (BGD). Addressing a less complex structure than that of BSD, BGD 
focuses upon a strong endorsement of attentional focus being on the biological and 
genetic origins and how they make up a person’s character. Both the BGD and BSD are 
considered as important contributors to the study of essentialist processing and socio-
cognitive concepts, however, BGD is also considered a component in the perception of 
social group homogeneity (Rangel & Keller, 2011). 
When investigating the role of “perceived” intelligence, the drive for success, and 
violence, it is known those who make more genetic attributions to an individual’s 
character score higher when measuring traditional racism as well as modern or aversive 
racism. Additionally, noted is specifically the Asian-American population. Asian-
Americans who held the belief that genetic essentialism is true, are more likely to find it 
increasingly difficult to relate to both Asian and American cultures in turn increasing the 
ambiguity of messages processed by both groups (Chao, Chen, Roisman, & Hong 2007; 
Jayatene et al., 2006, 2009). 
Function of Lay Theories and Essentialism 
Serving as a catalyst in socio-cognitive motives, essentialist thinking is known to 
assist in the explanation and justification of others behaviors and essence. Yzerbyt et al. 
(1997) argued this in part, would endorse stereotypes as well as justify the treatment of 
outgroup members and assist the individual in rationalizing social inequities. Referred to 
as “fundamental beliefs”, this process serves three individual socio-cognitive needs (Jost, 





person is provided epistemic motives in which the desire for definitive answers is 
presented. Additionally, the person’s ideological motives are met. These include assisting 
in justifying social inequalities. And lastly, the existential motives, referring to the 
person’s desire to buffer any perceived threat to self. The reliance upon lay theories to 
explain racial differences is thought to enhance stereotyping and in turn lead to increased 
out-group judgments.  
Consequences of Lay Theories and Essentialism 
The lay theories of essentialist processing serve as a suppression-justification 
model of prejudice. The process endorses prejudice by those who are highly motivated to 
justify others and any ambiguous information. Additionally, this permits the expression 
of prejudiced attitudes as well as the expression of prejudiced attitudes, leading to the 
individuals believing they have authenticated negative reactions toward other social 
groups (Crandal & Eshleman, 2003). 
Proposing the essentialist lay beliefs serve as status-preserving beliefs, Rangel 
and Keller (2011) highlighted the negative attributes associated with social groups and 
those who endorsed the lay theories of essentialism. It’s suggested the endorsement of 
these theories could be the reaction secondary to the prejudiced attitude and the person’s 
need to justify the activism of such attitudes. 
Entitativity 
Entitativity is described as being an epistemic process in which a collection of 
individuals are considered as being together and form a coherent group (Clark & 
Wegener, 2009). First introduced by Campbell (1958), the term refers to the nature of and 





as compared to group who are perceived as less coherent. Perceived knowledge about the 
target group is shown to result in an increase in effort needed in the processing of new or 
different information gleaned about the group (Clark & Wegener, 2009). Entitativity, 
when considered as generalized beliefs, is known to be closely related to the act of 
stereotyping. 
The conceptualization and estimates of probability of an individual possessing 
particular attributes, due to belonging to a group, or entitativity, is analogous to the 
individual attempting to identify a normative standard. In studies investigating social 
judgments and subjective probability, the individual’s judgment is shown to be based 
upon one of three categories in the Bayes’ theorem which offers the normative standard 
for all social judgments. One category in the Bayes’ theorem suggests the conservative 
individual will give individualized information too little attention while entertaining a 
significant amount of influence from prior probabilities (Rasinski, Crocker, & Hastie, 
1985). 
Social entities on a wide scale are known to mirror the perception of “imagined 
communities”. While considering the Gestalt approach to social entitativity this perceived 
similarity is one of four separate components, which include factors that enhance the 
perception of group entitativity. Included are the perception of the group having a 
common fate, salience, boundedness, and similarity, and the most important being the 
individual’s perception of entitativity leading to the belief in a common fate of group 







In-Group and Outgroup Entitativity 
Perceived group entitativity is described as the degree a group is perceived as a 
homogenous unit and is known as an important precursor when considering inter-group, 
in-group, and outgroup perceptions and stereotypical thoughts (Yzerbyt et al., 2004). 
Several empirical studies show the individual with negative attitudes or extreme opinions 
about an outgroup are significantly more entitative than those who are not (Grzesiak, 
Feldman, & Suszek, 2008). In addition to these findings, Whildschut, Insko, and Pinter 
(2004) argued the perception of groups considered as entitative may lead to significant 
negative impressions and distrust of outgroups. Additionally, the phenomena coined 
“collective retribution” by Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, and Ames (2006) is 
thought to be the result of judging a group as an entitative group as well (Phelps, 
Ommundsen, Turken, and Ulleberg, 2012). 
Entitativity is indicated as being significant in the perceiver’s beliefs of group 
similarity. A group whose members look the same, are perceived as thinking and acting 
the same, thereby considered a highly entitative unit. This unit is then assumed as one 
having many similarities (Crump, Hamilton, Sherman, Lickel, & Thakkar, 2010). 
Entitativity ratings are found to be higher dependent upon how often group members 
interacted, according to research performed by Crump et al. (2010). When investigating 
similarity among group members, this same study indicated entitativity ratings are subject 
to more strongly predicted significance when information about the similarity of the 
group members was presented (Crump et al., 2010). 
In congruence with this research when utilizing Campbell’s (1958) four 





that in-group influences affect the level of the identification within the group as well 
(Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003). The individual will use epistemic entitativity 
by using the degree of similarity within the group, the situational salience of the in-group, 
the clarity of boundaries, and the degree of similarity within the group to base judgments 
upon (Castona et al., 2003). 
When considering in-group behaviors and EEE processing, the individual 
considers their own group as being highly entitative. These group members will in turn 
exclude group members who may deviate from the perceived group norms. This may be 
considered as a motivation in the freezing of the EEE processes. These findings might 
lead to the expectation that in-groups may be considered in more entitative terms and 
outgroups be considered in a more homogenous manner (Crump et al., 2010). 
The effects of valuation and devaluation in the individual’s goal-congruent 
activities are known to be more valued and epistemically sought while goal-incongruent 
activities are devalued. This occurs within group members as it does with outgroup 
perception. These processes are shown to be in line with the epistemic process of NFC 
and a preference for group homogeneity or entitativity (Lalwain, 2009). 
Perceived group homogeneity lends itself well to the individual’s preference for 
predictability and certainty, both thought to be pre-cursors to the NFC (Fox & Elraz-
Shapira, 2005; Roets & Van Hiel, 2010). Group level information and the perception of 
group homogeneity is shown to be in those individuals with a high NFC (Roets & Van 
Hiel, 2010). Entitativity, as presented by Ableson, Dasgupta, Park and Banaji (1998) may 
be identified as an agency described as the individual who perceives a social being as 





and consist of differentiated yet interacting parts, are considered entitative. The 
individual who epistemically processes to the extent in which an entity is as one, and 
which consists of differentiated parts that are entirely interdependent upon each other is 
considered agentic (Lickel et al., 2000). When the agentic individual has previously 
examined the entitativity of either in-group or outgroup members, the process entails the 
recognition of the group as a whole as opposed to individuals. 
Groups may present as those that vary along a continuum of entitativity, with 
some that are perceived by others as having a higher propensity for entitativity than 
others. Groups with a high level of entitativity are also perceived differently than groups 
with a low level as noted by extensive research. Groups with members that are perceived 
to all look the same, as well as behave the same, and think the same, are more likely to be 
considered a highly entitative unit (Crump et al., 2010). 
An individual’s motive for social identification may elicit stronger levels of 
entititativity to reduce the individual’s uncertainty. Because the individual is in constant 
search for symmetry when faced with both assimilation and differentiation, group 
members may find a greater bond with those with which they feel assimilated. This 
feeling of assimilation further raises the level of perceiving an increased differentiation of 
others who are perceived as being different. This may be considered an additional pre-
cursor to the freezing of the EEE processes (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). 
A person with high levels of entitativity is known to make exacting and harsh 
evaluations of those thought to be negative group members. Those that have a higher 
level of perceived entitativity are argued to possess a higher social identity value. The 





are members of a highly considered entitative group are found to pose a more serious 
threat than even those from groups considered more inconsequential (Lewis & Sherman, 
2010). 
Perceived Agency and Entitativity 
Perceived agency occurs when a social being is recognized as having mental 
states which include intentions and beliefs. Those who hold theories of agency will, when 
referring to an individual or group, consider this group as one with intentionality and 
autonomy. When utilizing group agency, the group is thought to be as one and is 
responsible for its action. Perceived agency, as it refers to expectations about shared 
group intentions and goals is found to increase perceived entitativity by the extent to 
which the perceiver attributes dispositional tendencies (Morris, Menon, & Ames, 2001; 
Welbourne, 1999). When a group is thought to be entitative, one member can be 
considered responsible for another member’s actions therefore suggesting a conceptual 
association between agency and entitativity (Likel, Schmader & Hamilton, 2003). 
In 2000, Lickel et al. provided empirical evidence suggesting essentialism and 
agency depict the interrelated aspects of the individual’s perceptions of social objects as 
true entities. This evidence followed a study in which the judgments of collections of 
people were examined as a perceived entitativity. The results indicated the extent to 
which social entities were thought to have a shared goal was strongly correlated as were a 
common outcome and frequent interactions with other members. Additionally, this same 
study provided evidence of perceived similarity and un-alterability although the 






Entitativity, Stereotyping, and Prejudice 
In highly entitative groups the individual traits that are abstracted are associated 
with the group, as well as the members of the group, thus providing a stereotype. When 
the perceiver has processed the stereotype, the group is continued to be processed as a 
whole as opposed to individual members (Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002). When 
highly entitative groups are cognitively processed, the perceiver develops considerations 
beyond the characteristics of individual group members. This, and additional associations 
provide for a more difficult time recollecting any specific information about the 
individual group member. Groups who have a high level of entitativity are considered as 
being those who are more associated with an increased number of prototypic 
representations. 
Demonstrated by Welbourne, Harasty, and Brewer (1997) entitativity may 
reconcile the association between the group members being stereotyped and the more 
generalized opinions of the individual group members as being whole representatives of 
the group. The intensity of the relationship between stereotyping and generalizations 
depends upon the strength of the expectancy the individual holds regarding the stereotype 
(Stangor & McMillan, 1992). This takes place in addition to assessing the motivation the 
individual must have in an attempt to form simple and coherent impressions of the group 
(Crawford et al., 2002). 
The individual with perceived entitativity will be positively correlated with the 
expectancy strength of a group as well as stereotyping (Brewer & Harnisty, 1997). When 
considering the groups expectancies, this finding is important in that it shows the 





others and those expectancies are based upon the group dynamic when the group is 
considered highly entitative. In turn, this group is seen as one in which increased 
stereotyping behaviors are in tandem with an increased level of assimilation of the 
individual as compared to the group stereotype (Hilton & Hipple, 1990). 
Yzerbyt and Schadron (1994) argued that one of the most pertinent aspects to 
entitativity and prejudice was the suggestion the stereotype was not only descriptive of 
social groups but also the explanation of the group which one might consider to be their 
essence. Researching the relevance between entitativity and stereotyping, an important 
question to be answered is assessing when the individual is perceived as a member of a 
group and when they are perceived as an individual. This is done in an attempt to identify 
how both individual and group-relevant information affects the individual’s impression of 
others (Crawford et al., 2012). This will provide additional information as to when the 
individual processes only to the point of behavioral-trait association further encouraging 
the freezing of the EEE processes (Crawford et al., 2012). 
When a group is considered in the context of a contrasting entity, the perceived 
information is known to motivate the formation of a stereotype and in turn, results in the 
formation of the maximal differentiation between the two. This has been shown to occur 
even when the group in question is not considered as one that is highly entitative 
(Crawford et al., 2012). The information the individual processes traits will stop at a level 
of individual trait inference when processing information about members from a low 
entitative group. When the trait of another has been abstracted from their behavior the 






Individual traits are associated with groups as whole entities when considering the 
process of stereotyping and traits. Crawford et al. (2002) demonstrated this when noting 
an individual who cognitively processes behaviors performed by members of a highly 
entitative group, processes the traits of others as those that become associated with the 
individuals within the group. Based upon a continuum or “in-line” group impressions, as 
opposed to individual members, these epistemic processes provide for an increasingly 
high association with the direct members of the group. 
Those with underlying explanations for stereotypes, as described by Crawford et 
al. (2002), identify substantially with highly entitative groups or those with highly 
entitative characteristics. Groups who are highly entitative are known to perceive in-
group members as those who are more effective in supporting a similar agenda in order to 
fulfill personal needs. The in-group members are in turn protected by others in an attempt 
to guard against perceived external threats (Moscatelli & Rubini, 2014). Social 
psychological research indicates the phenomena of stereotyping and prejudice between 
inter-groups might benefit from a closer examination of the entitative processes. 
Relatively few research studies have been dedicated to the exploration of the individual’s 
beliefs and subsequent influence upon judgment of groups as a whole entity (Dasgupta, 
Banaji, & Abelson, 1999). 
Groups with an increased entitativity level are more apt to glean an in-group 
strategy which leads to discrimination and the member maximizing the differences 
between the in-group and the outgroup. This leads to increased discrimination as a result 
of the member utilizing maximum effort to gain in-group profits. As a result, high 





demonstrate little concern with equality and joint efforts to improve an outcome. This 
also leads to the perception that outgroups are more harmful and easily produce more 
negative attitudes (Moscatelli & Rubini, 2013) in the individual perceiver. 
Entitativity is reflected as a reference to the psychological cohesiveness in social 
groups when salient cues of perception are presented. This can include both physical and 
special similarity. Additionally, it is expected individuals who share membership in a 
particular racial group are also considered to share similar race-related characteristics 
(Campbell, 1958). Minority groups are considered to be highly entitative. As 
demonstrated by Dasgupta et al. (1999), individuals belonging to non-entitative groups 
are more likely to be individualized by out-group members, more so than those from 
highly entitative groups. 
Social groups who appear to be interconnected and unified are less likely to be 
considered by perceivers as having individual differences and are more apt to focus upon 
the groups invariant similarities. Furthermore, the influence of perceived group 
entitativity encourages the notion the groups may engage in aggressive and harmful 
actions against members of outgroups. The understanding of the malleability of the EEE 
processes and the development of stereotypes in particular is an important topic when 
investigating individuals who are presented with new or unfamiliar social groups 
(Dasgupta et al., 1999). 
Social groups who resemble each other are expected to have shared characteristics 
which are invariable. These beliefs are ones that play an important role in both the 
development of new stereotypes in which perceivers will search for a typical member to 





atypical (Dasgupta et al., 1999). Salient physical properties, provide the individual with 
the tools thought needed in order to develop stereotypical mind sets that have been 
amenable to salient physical properties. These physical properties are shown to relate to 
the assumption of psychological assimilations as well (Dasgupta et al., 1999). This 
argument is in tandem with Campbell’s (1958) presentation suggesting that physical 
similarities might be considered as overt manifestations of the underlying psychological 
nature of the group. The creation of stereotypes may be related to the perceiver 
attempting to derive their beliefs from observable features and characteristics of the 
group. Cognitive associations, between both physical and psychologically assumed 
characteristics may present additional justification of the individual’s freezing of the EEE 
processes in the individual’s attempt to protect and guard against newly presented 
information. 
The development of prejudice with regards to outgroups was demonstrated by 
Dasptuga et al. (1999) as being accurate for entitative groups and are considered as being 
those that are “active agents” poised to engage in harmful judgments and actions against 
outsiders. These findings are parallel with the Campbell’s (1958) argument that even 
when group-relevant knowledge is absent, when an out-group members are considered 
similar, the perceived purposeful organisms can appear as threatening to those observing 
from outside of the group. This phenomenon has been extensively researched since the 
original postulation by Campbell (1958) and numerous researchers have demonstrated 
that group interactions are interspersed with distrust and competition (Dasgupta et al., 
1999). Inter-group relations and the entitative process continue to be researched in an 





Entitativity, Essentialism, Stereotypes, and Prejudice 
Yzerbyt et al. (1997) proposed two factors that reinforce each other in the 
individual’s perception of groups. These factors include the level of organization and 
similarity of the group, also known as entitativity and the essence of the group which 
references the perceived and detected similarities, also referred to as essentialism. Well 
documented are the reactions of an individual and their subsequent EE behaviors toward 
not only their in-group but outgroups as well. The entitativity of a social group is found 
to encourage the perceiver to conjure an underlying essence for others, thus providing an 
account for the individual’s observed regularities and irregularities. 
This process could inspire the perceiver to induce a causal essence in which the 
group is viewed as that in which observed regularities are noted. Another view is the 
designation of the deep characteristics viewed to be possessed by a social group are likely 
to reinforce the individual’s search for organization and similarities and therefore result 
in the individual construing the group as an entity (Yzerbt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001). 
When considering the role of entitativity and information processing and 
behaviors, researchers have explored multiple copulations of the intertwined processes of 
social perceptions (Dasgupta et al., 1999; Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 1998; Yzerbyt, 
Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998). As early as 1996, 
Hamilton and Sherman demonstrated the individual perceiver will engage in observable 
differing mental operations dependent upon the assumed entativity of the encountered 
target. These findings, in part, are analogous with the concept of essentialism as a whole. 
The theory based concept of essentialism according to Murphy and Medin (1985) 





possess essences. The perceiver often utilizes concepts that are grounded in essentialist 
implicit theories. More recent research indicates this to be the case in lay people holding 
essentialist theories living things, but not about the human itself. Essentialism, as it 
relates to social categories, for example, Italians, Jews, or a group at a sporting event 
(Murphy & Medin, 1985; Medin & Ortny, 1989) others are often treated as those of a 
“natural” type of group and the notion of the true essence. In turn, it is rare for the 
individual to process the group members as individual artifacts. This social categorization 
is viewed as a consequence of the individual’s established needs, desires, and 
conventions when based upon the concept of essentialism (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). 
When allowing for the notion of entitativity and essentialism it’s important to 
contemplate the connection between the two processes. Entitativity as defined by 
Campbell (1958) was described as the degree to which an individual has the ability to 
consider the nature of an entity as one having a real existence. This notion was explored 
by Yzerbyt et al. (1997) and was referred to as the impact of numerous group properties 
regarding the individual’s judgment of entitativity. The distinction between entitativity 
and essentialism within the perception of group’s domains has been shown as having 
reminiscent characteristics of other distinctions in social psychology. Subjective 
essentialism indicates the stereotype, in addition to being considered as a convenient 
means to facilitating the individual’s dealing with a confusing environment, also serves 
the individual by providing an important subjective meaning to the surrounding world 
(Oaks, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Yzerbyt et al., 1997). 
Stereotypes are known to function as the individual’s enlightening due to their 





the existing set of interrelated information that has already been possessed. These 
stereotypes, being perceived as interconnected information, assist the individual in 
compiling a more complete list of attributes that in turn is perceived as assisting in the 
more thorough description of a social group (Yzerbyt et al., 2001). 
Additionally, these cues can encompass the basis for the individual’s 
understanding of the relationships among the group member’s attributes. Yzerbyt et al. 
(2001) argued the linking of not only observable features but the individual’s deeply 
inherent characteristics are involved. This association may assist in the justification and 
understanding of an individual’s aptness to steer towards making social arrangements 
based upon the representation of social divisions.  
Neuroscience and Race Relations 
Neuroscience and culture is an evolving field of research in which cultural 
differences and behavior are investigated as they relate to neural activity and circuitry. 
The method of neuroscience is especially important when considering social perception 
(Mason & Morris, 2010) Social scientists have long depended upon the investigation of 
galvanic skin response or non-specific brain activity via the use of the 
electroencephalogram (Aragona, Kotzalidis, & Puzella, 2013). Important to this research 
is the inclusion of the neural processes, as they relate to the individual’s EEE processes. 
In an attempt to provide the answers to questions and problems entailing the processes of 
behavior, brain functions, and race, Kubota, Banaji, and Phelps (2012) and Rule et al. 
(2013) investigated and reviewed the capacity of cultural neuroscience, the insights, and 





The benefits of understanding neuroscience as it relates to race can be seen by 
observing both the plasticity and capacity for the individual’s ability to adapt. Rule et al. 
(2013) claimed the brain can become static, in other words processes are known to freeze, 
such as the EEE functions. Being considered the invention of the individual’s genes and 
innate biological copulations, recent studies indicate the experience an individual has 
and/or the exposure to such circumstance that they experience can be the pre-cursor to 
both structural and functional changes in the brains design (Han & Northoff, 2008). 
Human brain genes, and innate biological processes, are shown to be involved 
with the individual’s experience and exposure to situations and are considered viable 
instigators of functional situational changes within the brain (Han & Northoff, 2008; Rule 
et al., 2012;). In a study conducted by Freeman, Rule, Adams, and Ambady (2009) the 
individual was found to possess cognitive neuropsychological processes in which the 
cultural dispositions of an individual influence both the behavior of the individual and the 
brain function of that person. Found as well was evidence that American participants 
were apt to endorse dominant values and in turn, behaviors would be exhibited in a more 
dominant way. This was corroborated by Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scans, 
mirror neurons and electrophysiology, showing the involvement of the amygdala and the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Aragona, Kotzalidis, & Puzella, 2013; Kubota et al., 
2012). 
The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is linked to the stimulation of assessing 
others intentions through the use of reasoning about the out-group member’s intentions. 
These tasks are assessed by the perceiver in an attempt to explain the others motive and 





the mPFC has been linked to inferences about the out-group member’s traits and 
dispositions. Involved in the EEE processes the mPFC is among the neural activation 
centers which is implicated as a strategy mechanism when consciously interpreting others 
mental states and disposition through attribution (Mason & Morris, 2010). 
The amygdala and its connections to the cortex is the area of the brain that is 
considered the region most affected when related to race attitudes and social decision-
making. These areas are also affected during the social processes of learning fear, 
processing emotionally relevant stimuli, attention, and memory. Another region 
frequently reported in neuroimaging studies of race is the ACC dorsal region of the brain. 
This area monitors for the individual’s response and any response competition. If conflict 
is noted the ACC will engage the person’s executive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001) allowing for the justification and reasoning of judgment. 
The psychological model of brain systems and racial attitudes suggest there are 
two stages involved when an individual processes racial stimuli. Neuroimaging indicates 
the amygdala and the fusiform gyrus (FFA) are two such systems. The amygdala is 
involved in the detection of racial stimuli and the evaluation of such as indicated by both 
physiological responses and the implicit association assessment (IAT). Additionally, 
shown is the FAA region quickly processing race information, especially in response to 
in-group race faces, and the amygdala is linked to implicit race preference and judgments 
of trust (Kubota et al., 2012). 
Neural Activity and EEE Seizing  
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in the brain is known to play an important 





information. The ACC is described as being the alarm in which the need for conscious 
analytic processing alerts the individual to perform further conscious analytic processing 
(Mason & Morris, 2010). Additionally, the ACC is known to be sensitive to a variety of 
perceived external conflict. Specifically, how an individual recognizes and processes the 
need for deliberation. Cognitive neuroscientists have long studied the need of the 
individual to engage in the controlled processing (Mason & Morris, 2010). This process, 
the ACC, as argued by researchers may play an important role in both detecting conflict 
as well as signaling the individual to proceed in a top-down method of control (Botvinick 
et al., 2001). 
When conflict is introduced, ACC activity is increased. This conflict may include 
the perceiver as one who is experiencing various forms of conflict. For instance, this has 
been noted when the individual’s expectations are somehow violated. This conflict will in 
turn, be indicated by an increase in the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) and signal 
this region of the brain to increase the individual’s neuro processes when confronted with 
ambiguous problems that lack obvious solutions. The need for an individual’s timely 
deliberation is likely signaled by the need to prevent automatic processes from taking the 
lead in the individual’s social sense making (Mason & Morris, 2010). 
When detecting conflict or an inconsistency, the individual’s neurological process 
of ACC will detect this encounter and signal the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to assist in 
drawing more time in conscious deliberation. This process can also be related to the 
individual’s NFC in an efficient and expedient manner relating back to the seizing of the 
EEE processes. Believed to support executive functioning, that is described as a function 





which the individual will engage in conscious manipulation of information even when it’s 
no longer present in the sensory environment (Mason & Morris, 2010). 
When attempting to quickly assess incoming stimuli social neuroscientists tend to 
agree when a behavior is considered ambiguous or inconsistent with a previously formed 
schema the ACC alarms other neural activation centers. This alarm signals the perceiver 
to use careful deliberation when attempting to decipher the meaning of the stimulus and 
integrate additional information prior to forming causal judgment (Mason & Morris, 
2010). However, in the seizing and freezing of the EEE processes, the individual may 
make a conscious or unconscious effort to ignore these signals. 
Amygdala Activation and Gender 
Derntl et al. (2012) argued the processing of faces caused the stronger and more 
sustained activation of the amygdala when processing outgroups. Findings between the 
activation of this processing when referencing outgroups, as well as the differences in the 
processing between genders, has been heterogeneous and inconsistent in the past. 
However, when comparing two culture specific male and females, Derntl et al. (2012) 
presented findings in which the Asian male, when processing male outgroup members 
showed a significantly stronger bilateral amygdala and neural activation than that of 
Caucasian males. Furthermore, Asian females responded similarly. This same result was 
presented when comparing Caucasian genders, finding there was no significant gender 
specific differences in amygdala and neuro activation, Derntl et al. (2012) do argue the 
female from a western region shows greater amygdala activation when associated with 
implicit emotional processing of out-group members. The two emotions showing the 





However, these two emotions have not been shown to have a noteworthy correlation to 
stereotyping and prejudice (Dasgupta et al., 2009). 
Both females and males exhibit only slight differences in the lateralization in 
amygdala activation. This difference might reflect differing cerebral strategies between 
genders when processing emotions. This slight difference may then be manifested 
through behavioral or functional outcomes. However, the male gender demonstrates a 
significant correlation between amygdala activation to fearful stimuli. Although the 
female gender also showed significant neuro activation, the data presented shows the 
male gender dominating this activation (Derntl et al. 2009). 
Culture and Neuroscience 
Both cultural and cognitive psychologies are interdisciplinary fields. Mason and 
Morris (2010) argued the consideration of culture when investigating behaviors through 
neuroscience is important in that culture has been shown to permeate the individual’s 
attributions and in turn will provide a more complete account of underlying cultural 
differences. Furthermore, the inclusion of cultural neuroscience research may assist in the 
better understanding of the EEE processes among groups. 
Both cultural neuroscience and the EEE processes have encouraged the 
consideration of the role of cultural functions in the individual’s brain, as well as its 
development. This further investigation may begin to breed and contribute to the 
relatively new field of cultural neuroscience. When considering cultural neuroscience as 
well as cognitive neuroscience, it important to consider these as interdisciplinary fields. 





background of the diverse fields, but also an enhanced understanding within both of these 
heterogeneous fields. 
Culture and ethnicity can both affect how the individual behaves as well as affect 
how they view and interpret the world through attentional processes and cognitive 
processing. For instance, the Westerner in particular those born and raised in the United 
States are found to possess dominant thinking and behaviors that are positively reinforced 
by assertive and skepticism of authority (Rule et al., 2013). 
When exploring cross-cultural differences, the cognitive neuroscience methods of 
investigation are presented as worthy additions to the social psychology approaches by 
providing additional insight into revealing differences that have in the past gone 
undetected when using traditional behavioral assessments (Mason & Morris, 2010). Brain 
imaging and cognitive neuro-scientific measures will allow for the additional exploration 
in the cognitive processing of individual’s EEE processing and may provide further 
insight into the freezing of neurocognitive activation centers.  
Summary and Conclusions 
Studies of the EEE processes emphasize its functions as a proxy to the 
individual’s cognitive processing of individuals and groups based upon perceived 
similarities. Prior research has indicated the epistemic processes are a catalyst in 
motivating the construction of perceived knowledge resulting in the individual’s act of 
applying subjectivity to social reality (Kruglanski, 1989, 2004). In addition, these studies 
draw attention to the individual’s tendency to engage in quick judgments based upon 





in providing a desirable outcome to ambiguous information in a quick and easy fashion, 
thereby making any additional information as an inconvenience (Rangel & Keller, 2011). 
The EEE processes are also known to possess a tendency for permanence through 
the epistemic need to protect information through the act of freezing. This epistemic 
freezing is done in an attempt to strengthen an individual’s current knowledge and protect 
the epistemic process from receiving any further contradictory information (Roets & Van 
Hiel, 2011b). Recent studies indicate the relationship between brain systems and the 
individual’s EEE processes (Mason & Morris, 2010; Rule, Freeman, & Ambady, 2013) 
and introduce the importance of further investigation into the mechanisms involved with 
the unfreezing of the EEE processes. 
Furthermore, these studies have provided insight into how the individual calls 
upon the EEE processes to assist in the judgment of outgroups, in particular racial 
outgroups, as well as the outgroup members who are perceived to share unchangeable 
characteristics based upon the receiver’s perception of the group as a whole. Little 
research has been provided in the area of social cognitive neuroscience and social 
psychological discipline into what, if anything, might be considered a facilitator in the 
unfreezing of the EEE processes as well as act as an agent in the continued malleability 
of the EEE processes. Chapter 3 will outline the quasi-experimental study design that was 
chosen for this exploration including the rationale, population, sampling procedure, data 








Chapter 3: Research Method 
This study adds to the body of research on the neurological processes of epistemic 
essentialist entitativity (EEE) as they relate to racial relations and outgroup processing. 
The purpose of this study was to assess the effectiveness of an 8-week multicultural 
psychosocial educational course on outgroup behaviors, customs, and beliefs on the 
malleability of the EEE processes. This chapter is a detailed description of the study’s 
research design. The following topics are covered: the descriptors and setting from which 
the sample was taken, the justification for the sample size, an explanation of the 
instruments to be used, ethical considerations, data collection, and data analysis plans.  
Research Design and Rationale 
A quantitative study was appropriate to examine the cognitive state of the EEE 
processes to measure any movement in the participants’ EEE processes. The data 
obtained from the sample can be generalized to the population of interest. In keeping with 
the essentialist theory of race (Chao et al., 2013), intergroup contact theory (Allport, 
1954; Pettigrew, 1998), and cognitive need for closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), I 
examined how cognitive EEE (dependent variable [DV]) may be affected by the 
academic introduction to psychosocial differences, practices, and social norms of various 
cultures. The cultural psychosocial differences, practices, and social norms were 
introduced through the presentation of educational material in a standard one semester, 8-
week, multicultural psychosocial college course that served as the independent variable 
(IV). I investigated whether participation in a psychosocial culturally rich educational 






To assess the effect of multicultural psychosocial information on the EEE 
processes, I measured the depth of cognitive salience by way of unfreezing and 
malleability prior to and following the introduction of the IV. The IV, an established 
college course, followed the college-wide course outline of record in which the major 
course objectives included the participants’ introduction to the history, contributions, 
cultural patterns, and social customs of major ethnic groups in the United States. 
Additionally, the participants taking the course examined the cultural impact of 
socioeconomic class and the cultural influence on time and space orientation. This 
course, offered by an accredited university, consisted of one meeting per week over an 8-
week term; each meeting lasted 2 hours and 50 minutes. 
I employed a quasi-experimental nonequivalent groups design in an attempt to 
answer the research questions. A quasi-experimental design was appropriate for this 
study because although participants were randomly selected for the comparison group 
from a list of undergraduate students, those participating in the course were not randomly 
assigned (see Blanton & Jaccard, 2008). The participants who received the IV (the 
multicultural psychosocial educational course) were those who willingly registered to 
take the class for college credit. 
The nonequivalent groups design was appropriate because participants in the 
course and the comparison group were administered a pre- and posttest. The unfreezing 
and malleability of the EEE processes, in which the individual becomes more aware of 
the incompleteness of his or her internalized representations of another culture or 
outgroup, as well as an increase, decrease, or stagnation of belief dimensions in 





2011b) served as the dependent variable (DV). The DV was measured using the 
Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). 
Tadmor et al. (2012) showed the effect of multicultural experiences in enhancing 
simple cognitive generalized motivation rather than more specific cognitive processing at 
deeper levels, such as those related to the epistemic essentialist processes. Additionally, 
Tadmor et al argued the individual shows a cognitive tendency to endorse stereotypes 
through consistent and long-term exposure to cultural experiences. This same research 
indicated the individual may become somewhat receptive to searching for additional new 
material following this consistent exposure. However, studies have also shown that the 
brief exposure to multicultural indicators has not been consistently correlated with 
epistemic change (Tadmor et al., 2012). 
Epistemic change has been demonstrated through the simple mentioning of a 
name in which cultural and semantic attributes are present, as shown in a 2007 study by 
Uhlmann and Cohen. Brief exposure to multicultural indicators, and epistemic change are 
powerful enough to activate stereotypes thought to be secondary to the epistemic 
essentialist entitativity processes becoming stagnant. This practice, frequently seen in 
discriminatory hiring situations, has been shown by Ahmed (2010) to be consistent with 
aversive racism and the freezing of the epistemic essentialist entitativity processes 
regardless of the brief or long-term exposure to multicultural experiences. 
This study contributed to previous research through the introduction of the 
consistent culturally rich educational material, which in turn addressed the exploitation of 
heuristics in metacognition. Addressing metacognition, as argued by Brinck and 





which are known to involve high degrees of consciousness and control. Additionally, as 
noted by Conger et al. (2012), metacognition serves as the classical conditioning-based 
explanation for adverse race-elicited emotions that have been noted in individuals when 
racially relevant stimuli are introduced. Any exploitation of the heuristics of 
metacognition have been addressed in this research with the consistent introduction of the 
multicultural psychosocial educational material over the course of the study. 
Methodology 
A convenience sample of 67 college students who had not previously engaged in 
or registered in a psychosocial multicultural course constituted the comparison group 
(Group A); 67 participants who were registered in a multicultural psychosocial course 
constituted the treatment group (Group B). After providing informed consent, both 
groups were asked to complete the Essentialist Entitativity Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 
2011) prior to the start of the 8-week course. The participants in Group A were not 
enrolled in a multicultural psychosocial educational course and had not taken this type of 
course in the past. Group B comprised those students registered in an 8-week 
multicultural psychosocial course. Following the 8-week course, both Group A and 
Group B were asked to complete the Essentialist Entitativity Scale (Roets &Van Hiel, 
2011) to assess any malleability in EEE processes. The data were analyzed using the IBM 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Version 21 (IBM SPSS -21).  
Population 
The population included 9,218 college students enrolled for the 2015-2016 
academic year in the Northeast region of the statewide college. The population included 





approval from Walden University’s institutional review board (IRB # 01-14-16-0397528)  
and from the institution where participants were enrolled. The total sample consisted of 
134 male and female college students age 18 years and older. The average enrollment in 
this course had consistently been between 70 and 120 students per semester. 
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
The comparison group (Group A) was recruited via a college-wide list of enrolled 
students ages 18 years and older. The potential participants for Group B were contacted 
via e-mail inviting their participation. The sampling criteria included students 18 years 
and older who were enrolled in a multicultural psychosocial course or who had not 
previously participated in such a course. Group A consisted of a convenience sample of 
67 students who were not currently enrolled in and who had never taken a multicultural 
psychosocial college course. Any student participants who took part in a previous 
multicultural psychosocial educational course were excluded.  
I conducted a G*Power analysis to determine the required number of participants 
based upon an effect size of 0.5. This effect size was chosen to represent the effect or 
significance of the multicultural psychosocial course on the participants’ posttest results. 
An intermediate effect size of 0.5, a power of 0.80, and α = 0.05 resulted in a total sample 
size of 102 participants, 51 in each group. When the G*Power analysis was conducted 
based on an effect size of 0.5, power of .90, and α = 0.05, the total sample size was 134 
participants. I knew that there were 67 students enrolled in the multicultural psychosocial 







Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
The recruiting procedure for the comparison group consisted of accessing the list 
of all students enrolled in the college following the approval of Walden’s IRB and the 
institution’s IRB. The convenience sample of Group B included those students registered 
for the multicultural psychosocial course. The demographic information collected was the 
participant’s age, year in school, gender, and ethnicity. Class attendance and absences 
were additionally noted throughout the study. A pretest was administered face to face via 
paper and pen to both groups prior to the term start, and a posttest was administered at the 
end of the term. Data were collected using the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale 
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a; see Appendix B) to measure the participants’ level of EEE 
beliefs.  
In addition to the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs scale post-test, I asked Group B 
participants to complete a debriefing document providing information regarding ethnic 
and cultural support groups, volunteer opportunities with various cultures, and a list of 
local resources catering to specific cultures and ethnicities. I included a questionnaire 
inquiring as to whether the student experienced any significant interactions with members 
of outgroups during the study and the number of class meetings attended during the 8-
week course. 
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
The IV was the 8-week multicultural psychosocial educational course that adheres 
to the college’s course of record (COR; see Appendix A) as mandated by the state of 
Indiana and the educational instruction accreditation body as well as the required 





delivered was developed by course developers qualified under the Indiana state board of 
education and certified course writers. The statewide approved core curriculum was 
written as an introductory social science college course and included lecture and video 
material encompassing multiple cultures, the customs within the cultures, as well as 
culturally based variations in attitudes, values, language, and gestures. The course was 
approved to be offered statewide at 32 campuses and was open to a student population of 
approximately 200,000 students. 
The course consisted of weekly, 2 hour and 50 minute sessions of exposure to 
various cultures, interaction with others representing these cultures, lectures, and video 
for a total of 8 weeks. The participants were assessed throughout the course on the 
material presented. These assessments were a part of the multicultural psychosocial 
course and were required by the college. These assessments were not included in this 
study’s data analysis. A sample of content questions developed by Hays and Erford 
(2014) is included in Appendix B. The data collected from the Essentialist Entitativity 
Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a; Appendix B) were collected prior to the course 
and after the course and were the only data analyzed for the purpose of assessing any 
movement in the EEE processes.  
Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale 
The Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) was used to 
measure participants’ current beliefs about racial groups and their homogeneity, 
informativeness, and inherence on a 7-point Likert scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 7 
(completely agree). Written permission was not needed to use this scale as indicated in 





and used for noncommercial research and educational purposes without seeking written 
permission (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). I agreed to distribute the scale in a controlled 
manner as mandated by the use of assessment permissions (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) and 
only to the participants engaged in the study. 
The scale was previously used by Roets and Van Hiel (2011a) in a study of 
undergraduate and adult participants of Flemish descent and was developed based on the 
three components of essentialist entitativity: uniformity, informativeness, and inherent 
core of racial groups. The scale was loaded on a single factor and demonstrated 
convergent validity when considering an alternative measure of essentialist entitativity 
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). Additionally, divergent validity was indicated when 
measuring entitativity beliefs considered not to be essence based, a form of essentialist 
processing. 
According to Roets and Van Hiel (2012), this scale was found to be significantly 
related to racial prejudice and indicated a superior level of predictive value when 
compared to other scales measuring essentialist entitativity. Internal consistency was 
shown to be good and was demonstrated across the samples to which it was administered 
as indicated by alphas of .78 to .85 (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Additionally, the scale 
has been implemented in varying cultures in the United States (Haslam & Levy, 2006) 
and Canada (Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 2014). 
Data Analysis Plan 
I used IBM SPSS -21to conduct the statistical analysis. The data cleaning 
consisted of repeatedly screening for any data abnormalities such as missing data or 





records, or inclusion of those in the comparison group who previously engaged in a 
multicultural psychosocial educational course were carefully observed. I used IBM 
SPSS-21 to screen the data via histograms and scatter plots, and double data entry was 
done as an additional method of screening. 
To measure the internal consistency to test for a unidimensional measure a 
Cronbach’s alpha was conducted. There were no additional tests required to measure 
unidimentionality; therefore, an exploratory factor analysis was not run. Lastly, the 
means and standard deviations of the variables were conducted and ANCOVA 
assumptions were confirmed (Schmider, Ziegler, Danay, Beyer, & Buhner, 2010). In 
order to address the following research questions, I ran a repeated measures ANOVA.  
Research Question 1: Is there a difference in the depth of cognitive salience 
through the malleability of epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college 
students who have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course 
compared to those who have not?  
H01: There is a difference in the depth of cognitive salience through the 
malleability of epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who 
have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those 
who have not. 
H02: There is no difference in the depth of cognitive salience through the 
malleability of epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who 
have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those 





Research Question 2: Is there a difference in the epistemic essentialist driven 
depth of cognitive salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be 
noted in the perception of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who 
have in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who have not? 
H12: There is a difference in the epistemic essentialist driven depth of cognitive 
salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be noted in the perception 
of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who have participated in a 
multicultural psychosocial education course compared to those who have not. 
Ha2: There is no difference in the epistemic essentialist driven depth of cognitive 
salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be noted in the perception 
of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who have participated in a 
multicultural psychosocial education course compared to those who have not. 
Threats to Validity 
External Validity 
A random selection of participants in the comparison group assisted in addressing 
the external threat of any lack of generalization (Blanton & Jaccard, 2008). However, as 
the participants engaging in the multicultural psychosocial course consisted of a 
convenience sample, a concern with generalization was recognized. Additionally, the 
interaction of personal factors or treatment effects, which describe the extent to which the 
IV might differentially affect the participants, was considered an external threat to 
validity. 
The ecological threats to external validity to be considered included the 





during the 8-week course serving as the IV limits the generalization to situations when 
the attention is not present (Chiesa & Hobbs, 2008). This possible threat was controlled 
for by assuring the IV was presented in a uniform manner as outlined in the COR. 
Internal Validity 
To control for the internal threat of maturation and history, the participants were 
asked to complete a debriefing document (see Appendix C) in which any historical events 
or natural maturational changes were considered for possible future research. An example 
question this debriefing document included was to inquire if during the 8 week research 
period the participant personally encountered or engaged in any significant or noteworthy 
interactions with an individual or group of individuals who they consider members of an 
outgroup which may have affected their answers on the post-test. Additionally, the testing 
and instrumentation threats was considered by removing any incomplete questionnaires. 
Regression to the mean was addressed through the attention paid to extreme outliers on 
the individual scores.  
Construct Validity 
The Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) measured 
the construct of essentialist entitativity. In the development of this scale an exploratory 
factor analysis indicated the structure of the essentialism construct measured with high 
primary loadings. These loading ranged from .37 to .75 describing the 16.3% of variance 
on the items reflecting inherence, uniformity, and informativeness. The items addressing 
immutability, necessity, stability, and naturalness showed a variance of 8.63%. With this 
high internal consistency being demonstrated, as well as the empirically distinguishable 





demonstrating a powerful predictor of racism (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). These findings 
assisted in decreasing the threat to construct validity. 
Ethical Procedures 
The agreements to gain access to participants were obtained from the Walden IRB 
and the institution’s IRB. Prospective participants freely registered for the multicultural 
psychosocial course. Prospective participants who registered for the course as well as 
those in the comparison group were presented with an informed consent. 
The multicultural psychosocial course consisted of weekly two- hour and 50- 
minute classroom lectures, videos, and multicultural education as outline in the COR (see 
Appendix A). Participants were informed of their legal rights in terms of understanding 
the nature and purpose of the study, their rights to consent to participate, and their right to 
retract from participation at any time during the study without fear of penalty, 
consequence, or harm. 
Both the comparison group participants and the participants in the class were 
asked to use the last four numbers of their phone number to be noted on their pre- and 
post-tests. This number was written on the informed consent and the participants were 
asked to note this number on both their pre-and post-test to serve as their private 
identification number. The informed consent forms were kept off-site in a locked file 
cabinet separate from the pre- and post-tests for the duration of the study. 
Data collected from pre- and post-tests were also stored off site in a locked file 
cabinet. I was the only person with access to both the informed consent forms and data. 
The data and the informed consents will be destroyed after being kept securely off-site 





Ethical concerns relating to data collection included early withdraw from the 
course and poor attendance by the participants. To address these possibilities, the 
participants were asked to follow the college policy of attendance, equaling class point 
penalties for unexcused absences. The participants withdrawing early would have been 
contacted via e-mail to inquire as to their possible continuing participation in the course 
as would any student would be, in accordance with college-wide retention efforts. 
Summary 
A quasi-experimental design was implemented due to a non-randomized sample 
of all participants. A non-equivalent group design was appropriate in that a pre- and post-
test were administered to two groups of participants. These two groups consisted of a 
comparison group and a group of college students who participated in a multicultural 
psychosocial course. The curriculum of the class included an introduction to various 
cultures and ethnic outgroups during an 8-week period of time as per the approved course 
curriculum. 
A convenience sample of the target population, college students 18 years and 
older served as the participants, and encompassed two groups with 67 in each group for a 
total sample size of 134. The sample of participants were those college students who 
enrolled in the multicultural psychosocial course and the comparison group was 
comprised of student participants recruited via a college-wide list of currently enrolled 
students. The comparison group participants were invited to participate via an e-mail 
invitation using the contact information provided within the enrolled student roster. 
In order to address the research questions as to if the introduction of a 





malleability of the EEE systems in those who participate and those who do not, I 
examined the role of consistent multi-cultural education and experiences and how they 
affect the EEE systems. The findings may have positive social change implications for 
informing the potential use of consistent and required multicultural psychosocial course 
throughout the educational grades of kindergarten through higher education.  
Grounded in the essentialist theory of race (Chao et al., 2013), intergroup contact 
theory (Allport, 1958; Pettigrew, 1998), and the NFC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), I 
utilized the empirically sound Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 
2011a) to discover if differences exist in EEE processing in and between students 
participating in a multicultural psychosocial education course and those who did not. The 





Chapter 4: Results 
The lack of movement or the stagnation of the EEE processes has been considered 
a catalyst for the development of stereotypical assignments to members of outgroups 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Cognitive processing, as related to the epistemic 
processes after the introduction of multicultural psychosocial educational material, had 
not been adequately addressed in the literature. The purpose of this quantitative research 
study was to investigate possible differences in the depth of cognitive beliefs about racial 
groups through EEE processes in college students who participated in a multicultural 
psychosocial course and those who did not. A nonequivalent control group design was 
used to assess college students’ beliefs about racial groups before and after an 8-week 
multicultural psychosocial course. Students who did not participate in the course served 
as the comparison group. 
The research questions and hypotheses addressed the possible difference in the 
depth of cognitive beliefs about racial groups between college students who participated 
in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who did not.   This 
chapter contains the data collection procedures including the timeframe for data 
collection, participant recruitment, and response rate. Demographic information and 
statistical findings are presented in tables to display the study’s results.  
Data Collection 
The potential participants were contacted via a school-wide invitation on 
electronic boards/television screens located throughout the college campus for a period of 
2 weeks prior to the next scheduled multicultural psychosocial course that began the 





Blackboard invitation to students already registered in the multicultural psychosocial 
educational course. Those registered in the course who chose to participate served as 
Group B. Participants who were not registered to take the course served as the 
comparison group (Group A). The participants responded to the invitation by attending 
sessions in which they were asked to provide informed consent and complete a pretest. 
There were no incentives offered. 
Pretest data collection consisted of a face to face pretest administration of the 12-
item Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale developed by Roets and Van Hiel (2011a). The 
pretest was administered from March 7, 2016 through March 11, 2016. All 134 
participants indicated they had not previously participated in the multicultural 
psychosocial educational course or in any other multicultural psychosocial course as a 
college student. 
The posttest reminders were displayed beginning the week prior to the final class. 
These reminders were presented via monitors throughout campus and in the classroom 
Blackboard venue. Both Group A and Group B were invited to one of three meeting 
times in which they were asked to complete the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale 
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) posttest. The meeting times were offered on three different 
days and in three different meeting rooms on campus between May 4, 2016 and May 9, 
2016. Following the completion of the posttest, all participants were given a three 
question questionnaire (see Appendix C) that addressed any possible adverse events 
taking place during the testing period that might be considered as possible threats to 
internal validity. No adverse events were reported by any participants in either Group A 





of community cultural and ethnic support groups, volunteer opportunities within various 
cultures, and culturally specific resources (see Appendix D). 
There were no discrepancies in the data collection as presented in Chapter 3. After 
each of the three meetings, the surveys, demographic information sheets, consent forms, 
and poststudy questionnaires were transported in brown inner-office envelopes to a 
locked file draw off site. All documents will remain in this secure location for 5 years. 
There were no markings identifying participant information on the outside of the 
envelopes. Each was marked with the envelope contents and Group A or Group B as 
appropriate. The pre-and posttests were matched to each participant using the last four 
numbers of his or her phone number. 
Descriptive and Demographic Characteristics 
Study participants consisted of 134 college students 18 years of age and older 
enrolled in a community college in the Northeast United States. The descriptive and 
demographic descriptive data were cleaned and all outliers were analyzed and corrected 
where appropriate. A post-hoc power analysis was conducted based on the 134 
participants and an effect size of 0.5, resulting in power of .89. 
As shown in Table 1, the total participant sample included 52 male students 
(38.8%)  and 82 female students (61.2%). Table 2 shows the race the participant 
idrntified with. A chi-square analysis revealed no significant differences in race between 






Participant Gender Groups A and B 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Gender                                                                 %                                              n  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Male                                                                    38.8                                          52 
Female                                                                 61.2                                          82 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 2 
Participant Race Groups A and B 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Race                                                                      %                                             n 
____________________________________________________________________________________                                                            
White                                                                     42.5                                        57 
Black or African American                                   25.4                                        34 
Hispanic or Latino                                                 14.9                                        20 
Asian                                                                        8.2                                        11 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander                        3.0                                          4 
Two or More Races                                                  6.0                                          8 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
         Table 3 shows the participants (Group B) college grade level as well as the 
comparison group’s (Group A) college grade level. A chi-square analysis revealed no 






Participant Year in School Groups A and B 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Year                                                                          %                                            n 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Freshman                                                                 17.2                                        23 
Sophomore                                                               33.6                                       45 
Junior                                                                        32.8                                       44 
Senior                                                                        16.4                                       22               
_____________________________________________________________________ 
The ethnic and gender demographics of the 67 participants in Group A, the 
comparison group, are shown in Table 4. The mean age of the participants in Group A 
was 29.9 years of age. 
Table 4 
Demographic Characteristics of Comparison Group (Group A) 
______________________________________________________________________Ch
Caracteristic                                                             n                                               %  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ethnicity 
White                                                                       28                                                41.2 
Black or African American                                     20                                                29.4 
Hispanic or Latino                                                   10                                                14.7 
Asian                                                                          5                                                  7.4 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander                          0                                                     0 
American Indian or Alaska Native                            0                                                     0 
Two or More Races                                                   4                                                  5.9 
Other                                                                          0                                                     0 
Gender  
Male                                                                         29                                                 42.6 








Year in School of Comparison Group (Group A)  
 
Year in School                                                              n                                              % 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Freshman                                                                       11                                          16.2                                                         
Sophomore                                                                    22                                           32.4 
Junior                                                                             22                                          32.4 
Senior                                                                            12                                           17.6 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6 shows the ethnic and gender demographics of Group B participants. The 
mean age of participants in Group B was 28.1 years old (SD = 8.7) compared to 
participants in Group A, whose mean age was 29.2 years old (SD = 10.1). 
Table 6 
Demographic Characteristics of Course Participants (Group B) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Characteristic                                                             n                                              % 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ethnicity 
White                                                                          29                                          43.3                                 
Black or African American                                        14                                          20.9                   
Hispanic or Latino                                                      10                                          14.9                                 
Asian                                                                            6                                             9.0                                 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander                            4                                             6.0               
American Indian or Alaska Native                              0                                                0                        
Two or More Races                                                     4                                                6                             
Other                                                                            0                                                0                                 
Gender  
Male                                                                            23                                           34.3                               
Female                                                                        44                                            65.7     
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
All races were not fully represented in both Group A and B as per the 





Census Bureau, 2010, 2014) as neither group included a participant of American Indian 
or Alaska Native descent. 
In the state of Indiana, as of 2014, the White population comprised 86.1%, which 
was an increase from 2010 when 84.3% of the population identified as being White. 
Those individuals identifying as Black or African American were 9.6% of the population. 
This total was also an increase in the Black or African American population from 2010 
when 9.1% of Indiana’s population identified as members of this race. American Indian 
and Alaskan natives in Indiana totaled 0.4%, Asian members represented 2.0% of Indiana 
residents, and Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander group members represented 0.1% of the 
population in 2014. Indiana residents who identified as being two or more races 
decreased in 2014 and totaled 1.9% of the state’s population. This was a decrease from 
the 2010 census data when 2.0% of Indiana residents identified as being two or more 
races (United States Census Bureau, 2014). 
According to the United States Census Bureau (2010), the U.S. demographic 
structure was estimated to consist of 76.3% of the population identifying as White and 
13.7% as Black or African American. Additionally, the U.S population was represented 
by 5.9% of Asian descent, 1.7% as American Indian or Alaska Native, and 0.4% Native 
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. Those within the U.S. population identifying as two 
or more races equaled 5.2%. 
Multicultural Psychosocial Educational Course  
The multicultural psychosocial course was administered over an 8-week period 
consisting of weekly meetings lasting 2 hours and 50 minutes each. No adverse events 





participate in the course for the full 8-week period. There were no reports of adverse 
events during or following the 8-week period, nor were there any environmental 
influences noted by any participants in the poststudy questionnaire (see Appendix C). 
Results 
The hypotheses asserted that through the malleability of the EEE processes the 
depth of cognitive salience and the perception of the psychosocial norm for race would 
differ between college students who participated in a multicultural psychosocial course 
and those who did not participate in the course. To test these hypotheses, an ANCOVA 
was performed after the participants completed the EEE Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) 
before and after an 8-week multicultural psychosocial course in which 67 of the 
participants (Group B) received psychosocial information and instruction regarding 
multiple cultures and perceived outgroups. A comparison group of 67 participants (Group 
A) was composed of college students who did not participate in the multicultural 
psychosocial course. Following administration of the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs 
Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) posttest all data were entered into IBM SPSS -21 for 
analysis. 
Results of an independent sample t-test showed that the mean score of the EEE 
Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) between the comparison group (n = 67), Group A (M = 
4.08, SD = 1.81) and participant group (n = 67), Group B (M = 4.02, SD = 1.88) was not 
significant t (132) = .187, df = 132, p > .05. 
A one-way ANCOVA was performed to examine any significant differences 
between the two groups. The assumptions of an ANCOVA were met such that data were 





Additionally, for the IV, the relationship between the DV and the covariate was linear, 
and the linear relationship was parallel, therefore satisfying the assumption of 
homogeneity of regression. The covariate was independent of the treatment effects. 
Internal consistency of the EEE scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) was analyzed using 
Cronbach’s alpha with results indicating a reliability coefficient of .72. A 2 (group) x 2 
(pre-post) multivariate ANCOVA was conducted. The multicultural psychosocial course 
served as the IV and the post-test scores of the items contained in the Essentialist 
Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) served as the DV. As measured by 
the Likert scale items, the level of the participant’s depth of cognitive salience and 
cognitive beliefs as related to racial groups were noted (see Table 8). 
Age was a covariate to control for participants’ life experiences. This covariate 
was chosen based upon research that found level of individual entitativity is related to life 
experience, group membership, and social identification (Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Crump 
et al., 2010). 
An ANCOVA was run to compare any malleability in the EEE processes as 
measured by the EEE pre-test, between the comparison group (Group A) and the 
participant group (Group B). The results revealed a significant difference, p <. 05 
F(1,132) = 10.6, p = <.001. Additionally, the results indicated that the malleability or 
movement in the EEE processes, as measured by the EEE post-test, for those in Group B 
who participated in the multicultural psychosocial course (M = 47.5, SD = 3.73) was 
statistically different than those in Group A who did not participate in the multicultural 





indicated that the adjusted means for Group A and Group B were 46.8 and 46.2, 
respectively.  
Table 7 
Between Groups EEE Posttest Results 
_____________________________________________________________________     
Group                                            M                          SD                         n 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
    
Comparison Group A                  47.7                      5.32                        67 
Participation Group B                 47.5                       3.73                       67  
______________________________________________________________________  
 
While continuing to control for the covariate, the age of the participants, an 
ANCOVA was conducted on each the analysis of the post-test for each of the 12 items of 
the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). The differences 


















Between Groups EEE Posttest Results by Item 
______________________________________________________________________ 
EEE Scale                           M                      SD                      
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
Item 1. Members of a racial group are usually very similar. 
Group A                             4.56                  1.66                    
Group B                             2.16                  .863  
                   
Item 2.  If you know to which racial group someone belongs, you know a lot about his/her personality 
Group A                             4.02                   1.63                    
Group B                             1.31                   6.78  
                   
Item 3. Despite apparent differences between members of the same racial group, in essence they are the same. 
Group A                             4.40                  1.75                     
Group B                             2.01                  .945   
                   
Item 4. Members of a racial group usually are identical in many respects. 
Group A                              4.07                 1.77                     
Group B                              1.95                 .842    
                  
Item 5. Membership of a racial group largely determines someone’s identity. 
Group A                              3.68                  1.66                    
Group B                              2.85                  1.36       
              
*Item 6. Members of a racial group share only superficial attributes, but actually they are quite different. 
Group A                               3.67                  1.77                   
Group B                               5.55                  .909    
                
*Item 7. Members of a racial group usually differ a lot from each other.  
Group A                               3.25                  1.51                   
Group B                               5.44                  .892  
                  
*Item 8. Knowing that someone belongs to a racial group, is not sufficient to judge a person. 
Group A                               4.74                 1.52                    
Group B                               6.62                 .775     
                
Item 9. Members of certain racial groups share a large number of underlying characteristics besides their superficial resemblances  
            or differences.  
Group A                               4.85                 1.35                    
Group B                               3.34                 1.37 
                    
*Item 10. Members of a racial group often have not much in common.  
Group A                              3.07                  1.25                    
Group B                              4.23                  1.14 
                    
*Item 11. Membership of a particular racial group says nothing about a specific person. 
Group A                              4.34                  1.63                    
Group B                              6.38                  1.23    
                 
*Item 12. Members of certain racial groups are often very different although they might look similar at first glance. 
Group A                              3.70                   1.64                   
Group B                              5.86                   .935                   
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________     





The test of between-subject effects in the one-way ANCOVA are displayed in 
Table 9 for each of the 12 items in the post-test Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale 
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). These results indicated that for each of the 12 post-test items 
there was a statistically significant difference between the groups. Please see Appendix B 
for the scale items. This difference was noted in the results by item. The mean score of 
Group B and the post-test item scores were significantly lower following participation in 
the multicultural psychosocial course and significantly higher on those items that were 
reverse coded. These results indicate movement or malleability of the EEE processes 





Table 9  
Between-Subject Effects of the EEE Posttest by Item 
______________________________________________________________________  
Source                                               SS            df              MS           F                  ES 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Item 1. Members of a racial group are usually very similar.                                            
                                                         169.4         1              169.4      244.6             .65 
Item 2. If you know to which racial group someone belongs, you know a lot about his/her personality.                                          
                                                                       171.3         1              171.3      188.0             .58       
Item 3. Despite apparent differences between members of the same racial group, in essence they are the same. 
                                           
                                                         137.1         1              137.1      179.9             .57 
Item 4. Members of a racial group usually are identical in many aspects.                                            
                                                         145.6         1              146.6      179.6             .58 
Item 5. Membership of a racial group largely determines someone’s identity.                                              
  28.1         1                28.1        24.3             .50 
*Item 6. Members of a racial group share only superficial attributes, but actually they are quite different.                                              
                                                           63.4         1                63.4        87.1             .39 
*Item 7. Members of a racial group usually differ a lot from each other.                                              
                                                           91.0         1                91.0       131.2            .50 
*Item 8. Knowing that someone belongs to a racial group, is not sufficient to judge a person.                                              
                                                           53.8         1               53.8          70.1            .34 
Item 9. Members of certain racial groups share a large number of underlying characteristics besides their superficial resemblances 
            or differences.                                               
                                                           62.3         1               62.3          45.9            .26 
*Item 10. Members of a racial group often have not much in common.                                            
                                                           37.8         1               37.8          35.2            .21 
*Item 11. Membership of a particular racial group often have not much in common.                                           
                                                          148.8        1              148.8        144.0           .52 
*Item 12. Members of certain racial groups are often very different although they might look similar at first glance. 
                                           
                                                           91.7         1                91.7       116.3            .47 
__________________________________________________________________________________        
Note. Items 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12 are reverse coded. 






The statistical analysis supported the research question asking if there is a 
difference in the depth of cognitive salience regarding racial groups and if there is a 
difference in the perception of the psychosocial norm for race between college students 
who have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to 
those who have not. Each group differed significantly on all items with item 10 on the 
EEE scale, “Members of a racial group often have not much in common” (Roets & Van 
Hiel, 2011b) showing the greatest statistical difference between groups following the 8-
week period, F (1,2) = 35.2, p = < .001. 
When noting the effect size for each post-test item between groups, the difference 
in the item answers within the total sample varied. The pre-test and post-test answers on 
item 1 showed the largest mean difference of approximately 65%. Item 1 asked if the 
participant considered members of racial groups to be very similar (Roets & Van Hiel, 
2011b). The least amount of variance in the pre-test and post-tests answers, although it 
may be considered moderate, was an approximate 21% difference in the mean score for 
the item which asked the participants their belief that members of racial groups often 
times do not have much in common (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). 
When asked their thoughts regarding the belief that members of racial groups 
share only superficial attributes and are usually quite different, the largest mean 
difference (63%) was noted between the participants pre- and post-test answers. The 
covariate, the pre-test question with the least amount of influence at 27% was noted when 
participants were asked their beliefs regarding members of certain racial groups sharing a 





resemblance. These findings reveal that there is a significant difference in the depth of 
cognitive salience through the malleability of the EEE processing between college 
students who have participated in a multicultural psychosocial course compared to those 
who have not as asked by the research question.  
The following chapter will include an interpretation of the study’s findings, 
limitations, potential implications for positive social change, and recommendations for 
future research in the area of the cognitive EEE processes as they relate to individuals’ 






Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of an 8-week multicultural 
psychosocial educational course on an individual’s depths of cognitive beliefs about 
racial groups and the depth of cognitive salience that could be noted in the perception of 
the psychosocial norm for race as indicated through the malleability of the EEE 
processes. The findings indicated a statistically significant difference in the movement of 
the EEE processes with the introduction of a culturally informative and rich course and 
the participant’s cognitive and salient beliefs about race. The EEE processes were shown 
to be malleable by the measurement of the participant’s beliefs. Those participants who 
did not take part in the multicultural psychosocial course did not show any statistically 
significant movement in EEE processes over the 8-week period. 
This study was conducted to investigate the malleability of an individual’s EEE 
processes after being solidified during an individual’s life maturation, which is known to 
lead to the freezing of the EEE processes (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Pirttlia-Backman 
& Kajanne, 2001; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). The malleability of the EEE processes was 
investigated through the introduction of culturally rich information regarding the 
similarities in different races as well as the differences within races regardless of their 
superficial similarities, such as appearance and racial categorization.  
Interpretation of Findings 
Research in the area of the EEE processes has highlighted the function of these 
processes as a substitution for an individual’s cognitive dispensation. An individual’s 
processing of both individuals and outgroups is known to be based on perceived 





has indicated that the individual is apt to view members of outgroups as essentially the 
same in their behaviors, beliefs, and thought processes based on their physical 
characteristics and racial category (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Additionally, studies have 
indicated an individual’s epistemic processes are a powerful incentive while forming and 
constructing perceived knowledge regarding outgroups (Kruglanski, 1994). The outcome 
of the application of this subjectivity into social reality is due to EEE freezing and 
stagnation resulting in the individual grouping outgroup members who appear the same 
or identify with a particular ethnic group (Kruglanski, 1989, 2004).  
The theoretical groundwork for the study was the essentialist theory of race (Chao 
et al., 2013), NFC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), and intergroup contact theory (Allport, 
1954; Pettigrew, 1998). The essentialist theory of race refers to the individual’s EEE 
processes becoming stagnant or frozen, especially those involved with essentialism (Chao 
et al., 2013). NFC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) refers to the individual’s cognitive 
epistemic need to engage in quick inferences and those that are most convenient. 
Intergroup contact theory also assisted in examining whether there was an epistemic 
essentialist drive depth of cognitive salience by examining the EEE processes following 
the introduction of a multicultural psychosocial course (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). 
The findings of this study indicated that the seizing and freezing of the epistemic 
and depth of cognitive salience through the EEE processes can become malleable 
following the introduction of culturally rich and informative material. Although an 
individual may theoretically engage in the NFC through intergroup contact, the 
essentialist individual’s EEE processes may be changed or moved with the introduction 





This study’s finding indicated that the depth of cognitive salience had been changed, and 
malleability of the EEE processes had been revealed. The essentialist theory of race 
(Chao et al., 2013) suggests that the EEE processes may become frozen and stagnant. The 
findings in this study support this theory as indicated by the comparison group’s minimal 
movement of the EEE processes as shown in their posttest results. With the introduction 
of multicultural psychosocial educational material, this study was grounded in intergroup 
contact theory by providing an open arena for the course participant group to address 
current and previously held beliefs about outgroup members. Additionally, the data 
supported NFC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) by which an individual engages in quick, 
convenient inferences that may be slowed through the intergroup contact theory. NFC 
was indicated in the posttest data where the participant group provided significant 
evidence of the cognitively driven consideration of essence-based differences in outgroup 
members as compared to the pretest data. 
Previous literature addressed the epistemological attitudes and beliefs of an 
individual’s metacognitive systems of knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997); those 
epistemological systems consist of beliefs about nature as well as perceived processes of 
knowing. Epistemic strategies serve as the individual’s knowledge-based regulatory 
validation system in which the intake of information is received. Additionally, these 
processes are known to assist the individual in making ethnic categorizations, which they 
perceive as social reality (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Supporting the previous literature, 
the pretest data indicated that both Group A and Group B differed only slightly in the 
participants’ perceived processes of knowing and conscious or subconscious perceptions 





accurate information viewed as the individual’s social reality by the participant’s 
responses to the pretest and posttest survey.  
Epistemic cognition (EC) has been found to be a significant component of human 
cognition as well as the epistemological processes (Chinn et al., 2011). Epistemological 
attitudes serve as an important component of an individual’s ability to ascertain the 
validity of information that has been received and cognitively processed. When presented 
with interrelated topics, the individual’s current belief system will consider a perception  
as truth. The understanding of all of these factors contributes to an individual’s 
epistemological attitude (Chinn et al., 2011).  
Described as an occurrence in infancy (Kruglanski et al., 2006), the cognitive 
epistemic processes the individual utilizes are based on ambiguity, lack of information, 
and assumption. This study included the introduction of additional and new information 
regarding various racial groups in an attempt to unfreeze or make malleable the 
individual’s EEE processes by presenting new and previously unknown thoughts, 
attitudes, and characteristics about differing racial groups. The results of this study 
support prior research suggesting that the EEE processes may be affected by consistent 
exposure to learning experiences and interaction with and about those in perceived 
outgroups. 
Limitations 
External validity was considered a primary limitation based on previous 
experiences participants may have had prior to the study. Additionally, the degree of 
uniformity of both groups prior to the multicultural psychosocial educational course was 





addressed by asking the participants in the comparison group not to participate in any 
multicultural educational courses for the duration of the study. Because it was not 
possible to thoroughly examine the degree of participants’ current level of essentialism 
based on previous experience with members of outgroups and their previous and current 
environmental influences, generalizability of this study’s findings is not possible. 
However, the results may be generalizable to men and women of various ages and ethnic 
backgrounds who have experienced a variety of environmental, social, and psychological 
influences when considering the introduction of intergroup contact and psychosocial 
multicultural information. 
The pretest data provided information regarding the participants’ current state of 
their EEE processes. I did not consider how previous experiences with members of 
outgroups may have affected each participant’s level of cognitive salience and processing 
of these experiences. I addressed another confounding variable through a posttest 
question asking participants to report any positive or negative interactions, life-changing 
events, or trauma they endured during the 8-week period of the study. Participants in 
Group A and Group B reported no personal life-changing events, trauma, or negative 
interactions with outgroup members during their participation in this study. The 
participants’ pretest scores were appropriately controlled for statistically through the 
application of the ANCOVA to account for prior life experience, age, and sociocultural 
environment that may have influenced the individual’s current EEE status. Participants 
who took the multicultural psychosocial course experienced an opportunity to address 
any personal prejudice or assumptions regarding outgroup members. I assumed that 






This study provided statistically significant findings regarding the malleability of 
the EEE processes between two groups while considering pretest EEE beliefs and 
cognitive salience about racial groups. Although I considered the age of participants as a 
covariate, future research might address other covariates as well. Investigating gender 
differences may offer additional insight into the movement or malleability of the EEE 
processes between men and women. Gender may prove to be an important consideration 
in future research in an attempt to assess the differences in the malleability of the EEE 
processes. 
Given that the freezing of the EEE processes is known to occur early in life 
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b) and has been shown to protect the information an individual 
currently processes, investigating the age of participants may offer additional knowledge 
about the depth of the individual’s solidification of the EEE. Additionally, future studies 
should include elementary and middle school participants to measure their beliefs about 
race through the EEE processes following a multicultural psychosocial course.  
Implications for Positive Social Change 
This study contributes to positive social change by providing statistical support 
for how the EEE cognitive processes regarding the individual’s beliefs and cognitive 
salience about racial groups can be affected by a multicultural psychosocial course. This 
knowledge could serve as an important catalyst in demonstrating that given the 
opportunity to engage in an open and informative education that addresses not only the 






In a multicultural society, the categorization of anticipated behaviors, intelligence, 
and attitudes based upon a person’s race and culture an understanding of the neuro-
psychological processes an individual possesses would add additional knowledge to an 
individual’s beliefs about outgroup members. An investigation of the individual’s 
processing of differences in an attempt to address the particular process of how he or she 
arrives at a certain judgment may enhance knowledge and awareness that his or her 
perceived solidified beliefs might be changed. 
As has been shown in the present study, the current beliefs and cognitive salience 
an individual holds regarding outgroups, as indicated through the EEE processes, can be 
manipulated or changed with consistent dialog, information, and exposure to outgroups. 
The consistent exposure through an 8-week multicultural psychosocial course has shown 
to have a statistically significant effect on the EEE processes. 
The purpose of this study was to assess the participants’ beliefs and cognitive 
salience about outgroup members by measuring any movement in the their EEE 
processes. The age of the participants was a covariate to control for previous life 
experiences. This study supports the malleability of an individual’s current beliefs and 
cognitive salience regarding members of outgroups through the introduction of 
multicultural psychosocial educational material. These findings support the notion that 
with the opportunity for individuals to participate in a multicultural psychosocial 
educational course, stereotypical beliefs, racist actions, and xenophobia may be reduced. 
Conclusion 
The EEE processes are a catalyst for the development of stereotypical 





& Kajanne, 2001); Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). This is an empirically based assumption 
that along with the results of the present study lends support for additional investigation. 
With the increase in racial violence, the Black Lives Matter movement, and racial tension 
on U.S. and foreign soil resulting in attacks based on perceived outgroup beliefs, 
behaviors, and essence, the basis of an individual’s psychological and biological driving 
forces should be investigated. Research into the social and biosocial aspects of social 
psychology has become more important and timely than ever. 
Based on findings from the current study as well as prior research, the 
malleability of the EEE processes is possible regardless of the age of the individual. This 
study has shown that with participants ranging from 18 years of age and above, the EEE 
processes can be influenced by an 8-week multicultural psychosocial educational course. 
The consistent exposure in such a course to the similarities, beliefs, and differences in 
cultural and ethnic groups may be advantageous throughout the formal educational years. 
Future studies should address age, gender, and race as factors in the introduction 
of culturally rich information introduced to individuals of all ages. Additionally, based on 
findings from this study supporting the malleability of the EEE processes, investigating 
the consistent offering of multicultural psychosocial rich information and exposure to 
outgroups should be considered and possibly mandated throughout the formal educational 
years. Findings from the current study offer hope in the possibility of human cognitive 
change, change in beliefs, and change in assumptions that an individual has regarding 
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Appendix A: Collegewide Course Outline of Record 
HUMS 270, MULTICULTURAL PRACTICE 
COURSE TITLE: Multicultural Practice 
COURSE NUMBER: HUMS 270 
SCHOOL: Public and Social Services 
CREDIT HOURS: 3 
CONTACT HOURS: Lecture: 3 
DATE OF LAST REVISION: Fall, 2013 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS REVISION: Fall, 2014 
 
CATALOG DESCRIPTION:  This course examines, from a theoretical and experiential 
social work perspective, the personal behaviors and institutional factors that have led to 
oppression of ethnic minorities, persons of color or other oppressed populations and those 
practices that serve to maintain inter-group tensions..  Attention is given to discriminatory 
practices as related to gender, age, religion, disablement, sexual orientation, culture, etc. 
It will explore the strategies that the various groups have employed to deal with 
discrimination. Implications to the individual, society, and professions are explored. 
 
MAJOR COURSE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon successful completion of this 
course the student will be expected to: 
 
1. Expand the level of awareness of attitudes toward human diversity including race, 
ethnicity, class, gender, religion, and sexual orientation, physical or mental 
limitations.  
2. Explain the dual/multiple perspective frame of reference and its importance for 
socialization and society.  
3. Explicate the concepts of stigma, stereotypes, prejudice and racism, minority, 
classism, homophobia, etc. 
4. Obtain a historical and contemporary perspective on ethnicity in American 
society. 
5. Explain the significance of ethnicity, race, gender, class, and sexual orientation in 
human development and family life. 
6. Discuss the strengths of various groups as evidenced in survival strategies. 
7. Understand the significance and impact of human diversity on society. 
8. Obtain a frame of reference for examination of issues and practices as related to 
diversity, economic and social justices. 
9. Utilize a research perspective in the study of ethnicity, race, gender, class, sexual 
orientation or other differences that impact society. 
10. Develop a commitment to empowerment strategies. 
11. Learn ways in which to operationalize a personal and professional commitment to 





12. Demonstrate critical thinking skills in examination and application of the course 
content. 




Determine need for culturally diverse socialization. 
Explore changing demographics, White privilege, and culturally diverse values. 
Understand socially constructed concepts for diversity. 
Develop strategies for effective cross-cultural relations. 
Discuss stress management and culture shock adaptation. 
Explore social interaction and communication rules. 
Discuss value orientation and history of ethnic communities in America. 
Understand importance of immigration, gender, and religion and sexuality 
difference in America. 






Appendix B: Essentialist Entitativity Scale 
1.  Members of a racial group are usually very similar. 
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
               Completely                                                                     Completely  
                   Agree                                                                           Disagree   
 
2.  If you know to which racial group someone belongs, you know a lot about his/her 
personality. 
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
                    Completely                                                                     Completely  
                       Agree                                                                             Disagree   
  
3. Despite apparent differences between members of the same racial group, in 
essence they are the same. 
 
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
                    Completely                                                                     Completely  
                       Agree                                                                             Disagree   
  
4. Members of a racial group usually are identical in many respects. 
 
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
                    Completely                                                                     Completely  
                       Agree                                                                             Disagree   
 
5. Membership of a racial group largely determines someone’s identity. 
 
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
Completely                                                                     Completely 






6. Members of a racial group share only superficial attributes, but actually they are 
quite different.  
  
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
                    Completely                                                                     Completely  
                       Agree                                                                             Disagree   
 
7. Members of a racial group usually differ a lot from each other. 
 
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
                    Completely                                                                     Completely  
                       Agree                                                                             Disagree   
 
8. Knowing that someone belongs to a racial group, is not sufficient to judge a 
person. 
 
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
                    Completely                                                                     Completely  
                       Agree                                                                             Disagree   
 
9. Members of certain racial groups share a large number of underlying 
characteristics besides their superficial resemblances or differences. 
  
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
                    Completely                                                                     Completely  
                       Agree                                                                             Disagree   
 
10. Members of a racial group often have not much in common. 
 
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
                   Completely                                                                     Completely  
                       Agree                                                                             Disagree   
 
11. Membership of a particular racial group says nothing about a specific person. 
                                7             6            5            4            3            2            1 





                     Agree                                                                               Disagree 
 
 
12.  Members of certain racial groups are often very different although they might look 
similar at first glance. 
 
7             6            5            4            3            2            1 
                   Completely                                                                     Completely  
                       Agree                                                                             Disagree   
 
Items 6, 7,8,10, 11, and 12 are reverse coded. 
Uniformity Items: 1, 4, 7, and 10. 
Informativeness Items: 2, 5, 8, and 11 
Inherence Items: 3, 6, 9, and 12. 






Appendix C: Participant Post-Study Questionnaire 
 
 




Please answer the following: 
 
 
1. During the 8-week period of the study were you the victim of a crime at the hands 
of a member of a different race or ethnic group? 
 
 




2. During the 8-week period of the study were you involved in any major life events 
involving a member(s) of a different racial or ethnic group? 
 
 





3. If you were a participant in the multicultural course, how many of the weekly 
class meetings did you attend? 
 
 






Appendix D: Participant Post-Study Resource List 
 
Following is a list of resources were you can find information regarding cultural and 





BURMESE ADVOCACY CENTER 
2424 Lake Avenue  
Fort Wayne, IN 46805 
(260) 755-2048 
http://www.bacindiana.org 
center@bacindiana.org                                                                                     
 
WCA NORTHEAST INDIANA 
1610 Spy Run Avenue  
Fort Wayne, IN 46805 
(260) 424-4908 Main Office 
http://www.ywca.org/nein 
 
ASIAN HELP SERVICES 
609 East 29th Street  
Broadway United Methodist Church 





NORTHERN INDIANA HISPANIC HEALTH COALITION 
444 North Nappanee Street  





IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER 
2236 East 10th Street  
John H. Boner Community Center 
Indianapolis, IN 46201 










IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER 
IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER BRANCH AT HAWTHORNE COMMUNITY CENTER 
70 North Mount Street  
Indianapolis, IN 46222 
http://www.immigrantwelcomecenter.org 
help@immigrantwelcomecenter.org 
IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER 
IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER BRANCH AT SAINT MONICA CHURCH 
6131 North Michigan Road  




IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER 
IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER BRANCH AT SOUTHEAST COMMUNITY SERVICES 
901 Shelby Street  




MARION COUNTY PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
3838 North Rural Street  
Hasbrook Building 
Indianapolis, IN 46205 
(317) 221-2106 Foreign Born Services 
http://www.mchd.com 
 
CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF FORT WAYNE-SOUTH BEND 
CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF FORT WAYNE-SOUTH BEND - SOUTH BEND COMMUNITY CENTER 
1817 Miami Street  




NORTHERN INDIANA HISPANIC HEALTH COALITION 
NORTHERN INDIANA HISPANIC HEALTH COALITION - WARSAW OFFICE 
1515 Provident Drive, Suite 140  
K21 Health Services Pavilion 





NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC 
NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC - ALLEN COUNTY 
347 West Berry Street, Suite 101  









Immigration/Naturalization Legal Services 
Programs that provide legal assistance for immigrants, nonimmigrant visa 
applicants, asylum seekers and lawful permanent residents who are seeking 
naturalization. Services are generally provided by nonprofit immigration law offices 
and may involve information and consultation about benefits under immigration law 
including procedures for obtaining student, visitor and employment-based visas; 
family immigration; asylee status; lawful permanent residence status; or citizenship. 
 
CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF FORT WAYNE-SOUTH BEND 
915 South Clinton Street  





INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF NORTHWEST INDIANA 
4433 Broadway  
Gary, IN 46409 





NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC 
NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC - LAKE COUNTY 
940 Broadway  
Catholic Charities 
Gary, IN 46402 






202 North Cottage Avenue  













NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC 
NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC - HUNTINGTON COUNTY 
255 West Park Drive  
Huntington Library 
Huntington, IN 46750 





CENTER FOR VICTIM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
201 North Illinois Street, 16th Floor South Tower 






INDIANA LEGAL SERVICES 
IMMIGRANTS AND LANGUAGE RIGHTS CENTER 
151 North Delaware Street, Suite 1800  
Market Square Center 
Indianapolis, IN 46204 
(866) 964-2138 Toll-Free 
http://www.indianajustice.org 
  
LATINO COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
300 East Fall Creek Parkway North Drive, Suite 200 
Julia M. Carson Government Building 
Indianapolis, IN 46205 
(317) 926-4673 





NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC 
3333 North Meridian Street, Suite 201   
Trinity Outreach Center 
Indianapolis, IN 46208 











NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC 
128 East Main Street  
First Presbyterian Church of Lebanon 
Lebanon, IN 46052 







DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) 
THE BRIDGE COMMUNITY CHURCH 
301 East Linden Avenue  
Logansport, IN 46947 




NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC 
1207 Conner Street  
First Presbyterian Church of Noblesville 
Noblesville, IN 46060 





EL CENTRO COMUNAL LATINO 
303 East Kirkwood Avenue, Room 200  
Monroe County Public Library 





ELKHART COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
ELKHART COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT - LINCOLN CENTER 
608 Oakland Avenue  
Lincoln Center 












MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS (MRC) 
AUDIO READING SERVICE 
7615 DiSalle Boulevard  





EXODUS REFUGEE IMMIGRATION 
1125 Brookside Avenue, Suite C9  
Indianapolis, IN 46202 




1630 North Meridian Street  
Indianapolis, IN 46202 
























1. If you were enrolled in HUMS 270, Multicultural Practice, this quarter, how 








___ I did not take the course. 
 
